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This Article examines the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska
Constitution, which states:  “To be valid or recognized in this
State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one
woman.”  It begins by tracing the origins of the amendment in
Alaska’s Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as the
relationship of one man and one woman, and the Brause v. Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics case, which held that the Defense of Mar-
riage Act was presumptively unconstitutional under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Alaska Constitution.
Then, the passage of the Marriage Amendment in the Legislature
and through popular ratification is narrated.  Next, the constitu-
tionality of the Marriage Amendment is analyzed with respect to
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the Alaska and the United States Constitutions.  The Article con-
cludes that the Marriage Amendment is constitutional and a valid
exercise of democratic self-government.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
They were the most unexpected judicial decision and state
constitutional amendment of 1998: Judge Peter Michalski’s deci-
sion in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics1 in February, followed by
the passage of the Marriage Amendment by the Legislature in May
and the voters in November.2  While all eyes were on Hawaii3 and
1. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
2. See S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).  The final version
of the Amendment approved by the Legislature proposed to add a new section to
article I of the Alaska Constitution that reads as follows: “Section 25.  Marriage.
To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one
man and one woman.  No provision of this constitution may be interpreted to re-
quire the State to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of the same
sex.”  The proposed amendment passed the House by a vote of 28-12, see House J.
3785, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998), and the Senate passed the amend-
ment 14-6, Senate J. 4157, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).  Between ap-
proval and ratification, the Alaska Supreme Court struck the second sentence
from the Marriage Amendment.  See Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821,
Preliminary Opinion and Order, at 8 (Alaska Sept. 22, 1998), aff’d, Bess v. Ulmer,
Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999).  On No-
vember 3, 1998, the one-sentence version of the Marriage Amendment was rati-
fied by the people by a vote of 68% to 32%.  See Cheryl Wetzstein, Gays Can’t
“Marry” 2 States Say, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A16.  For a more extensive
narrative and analysis of this process, see infra Sec. III.
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Vermont,4 where the battle over same-sex “marriage”5 had been
raging, Alaska suddenly became close to ground zero in the na-
tional marriage debate.6
On February 27, 1998, Anchorage Superior Court Judge Peter
Michalski held in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics7 that under the
Alaska Constitution, each person has a “fundamental right” to
choose his or her “life partner,” whether that partner is of the same
or opposite sex.8  His unprecedented decision provoked an ex-
traordinary reaction:  the introduction and passage of a state con-
stitutional amendment defining marriage as a relationship between
a man and a woman.9  The Marriage Amendment was challenged
between its passage and the November general election, and the
Alaska Supreme Court allowed a modified version to proceed to a
vote.10  On November 3, 1998, the Alaska Marriage Amendment
passed by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two percent.11
3. A plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court held in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993), that the State’s marriage statute constituted sex discrimination
under the Hawaii Constitution and was subject to strict scrutiny.  Four years of
fierce debate ensued, including a trial court ruling in which the judge held the
marriage statute unconstitutional.  See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996
WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).  The Constitution of Hawaii was
amended to read, “The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to op-
posite-sex couples.”  HAW. CONST. art. I § 23.  The Hawaii Supreme Court has not
issued a final decision in Baehr.  For a lengthy review of events in Hawaii, see
David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning,
and Constitutionality, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming special edition).
4. See Baker v. State, No. S1009-97 (Vt. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1997); appeal
pending, No.  98-32 (Vt. 1999).  As of August 1999, no decision had been issued in
this case.
5. We put the term same-sex “marriage” in quotation marks to reflect our
belief that same-sex unions are not marriages, a belief we realize some readers will
not share.  For a discussion of the substantive issues behind our beliefs, see David
Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage?  Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Mar-
riage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997).
6. For an overview of that debate, see David Orgon Coolidge & William C.
Duncan, Definition or Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the
“Same-Sex Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3 (1998); David Orgon
Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Anal-
ogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998).
7. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
8. See id.
9. See S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
10. See Preliminary Opinion and Order, Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-
8821 (Alaska Sept. 22, 1998).
11. See Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (copy
of Lieutenant Governor’s Certificate of Election), Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
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The three of us are not neutral bystanders in this debate.  We
support the Alaska Marriage Amendment, and one of us serves as
Counsel for the Legislature in defending the amendment.  We
share with our opponents, however, and all thoughtful observers
and concerned citizens, a desire to examine its context, meaning,
and implications for marriage and constitutional law.
This Article will address three questions.  First, what are the
origins of the Marriage Amendment?  In Section II, we look at the
history of Alaska’s marriage law and the Brause decision.  Second,
what can be learned from the passage of the Marriage Amend-
ment?  In Section III, we offer a narrative of the passage of the
Marriage Amendment, from initial introduction to post-passage
developments, looking for clues as to its intended meaning.  Third,
is the Marriage Amendment constitutional?  In Section IV, we con-
sider a variety of constitutional arguments that may be made for
and against the Marriage Amendment, especially in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,12 which
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that classified
on the basis of homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation.  We
conclude that given current trends, the Marriage Amendment is
likely to be held to be fully consistent with both the Alaska Consti-
tution and the Constitution of the United States.
II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
The Alaska Marriage Amendment originated as a reaction to
Judge Michalski’s decision in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics.13
However, neither the Brause decision nor the Legislature’s re-
sponse transpired in a vacuum.  In this section, we examine events
preceding the Marriage Amendment, including Brause itself.
A. Alaska’s Defense of Marriage Act
Before 1974, Alaska’s marriage statute expressly restricted
marriage to a union between one man and one woman.  Alaska’s
marriage code specified that marriage could be entered into by “a
male who is 21 years of age or older with a female who is 18 years
of age or older.”14  In an effort to comply with a 1972 amendment
tistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 1998); see also Liz Ruskin,
Limit on Marriage Passes in Landslide, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1998,
at A1.
12. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
14. Act of Apr. 13, 1963, ch. 58, § 1, art. I., 1963 Alaska Sess. Laws 54 (enact-
ing ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011: Civil Contract Requirement for Marriage).  The
statute was modified in 1970 to reduce the age at which a man could marry to 19.
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to article I, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution that prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex, the age of consent for marriage
was changed to nineteen for both sexes in 1974.15  The revised stat-
ute also replaced the words “man” and “woman” with the word
“person.”16  Nothing in the legislative history suggests an attempt to
allow persons of the same sex to marry.17
In early 1995, the Superior Court in Fairbanks heard a case
challenging the University of Alaska-Fairbanks’ (“UAF”) policies
limiting spousal benefits to the “husbands” or “wives” of its mar-
ried employees.18  Superior Court Judge Meg Greene set loose a
firestorm when she ruled that UAF could not legally limit spousal
benefits to husbands and wives.19  Although not central to her deci-
sion, Judge Greene suggested that the gender-neutral marriage
statute might allow for same-sex marriage.20  
As a result, the Legislature became aware that the marriage
statute could be misinterpreted.  While courts in other jurisdictions
have held that gender-neutral marriage codes do not necessitate
same-sex marriage,21 in light of Judge Greene’s ruling, the Legisla-
ture was not willing to entrust the marriage statute to the Alaska
Judiciary.  In 1996, the Legislature changed the marriage statute to
accomplish two goals: (1) to clearly provide that for purposes of le-
gal recognition and status, marriage in Alaska could exist only be-
tween one man and one woman; and (2) to clearly prevent any
same-sex marriage, validly performed in another State, from being
recognized in Alaska.  As finally amended, the Alaska marriage
statute read as follows: “Marriage is a civil contract entered into
between one man and one woman that requires both a license and
See Act of June 27, 1970, ch. 245, § 9, 1970 Alaska Sess. Laws 2; see also Alaska
State Legislature, Legislative Research Agency, Memorandum on Legislative His-
tory of AS 25.05.011 (Mar. 8, 1995).
15. See Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 127, § 92, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 17.
16. See id.  The statute was modified again in 1975 to reduce the age of con-
sent to 18.  See Act of Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 28, § 1, 1975 Alaska Sess. Laws 1.  The
Legislature retained the gender-neutral language without comment.
17. See 1995 Alaska Op. Att’y Gen. 663-95-0451 (Mar. 31, 1995), at 1995 WL
341035.
18. See Tumeo v. University of Alaska, No. 4 FA-94-43, 1995 WL 238359
(Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 7 n.8.
21. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1111 (1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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solemnization.”22  In addition, it provides that any same-sex mar-
riage recognized in another jurisdiction is void in Alaska, and any
contractual rights granted by such a marriage are unenforceable.23
B. The Trigger: Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics24
In 1995 two men, Jay Brause and Gene Dugan, relying on the
then-gender-neutral marriage code, and in the wake of the Hawaii
Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin,25 submitted an appli-
cation for a marriage license to the Alaska Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics, Third Judicial District at Anchorage (hereafter “the Bu-
reau”).26  The Bureau denied the application.27  Subsequently,
Brause and Dugan sued the State seeking to have the interpreta-
tion of the marriage statute denying same-sex marriage declared
unconstitutional, and to have the State permanently enjoined from
denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.28
Before an initial hearing was held, the Alaska Legislature
amended the marriage statute to eliminate the gender-neutral lan-
guage and restrict marriage to one man and one woman.29  The
plaintiffs then amended their complaint to ask for a declaration
that this statute was also unconstitutional.30  They argued that the
failure of the State to issue them a marriage license denied them
due process and infringed their right to privacy under the Alaska
Constitution.31  The Attorney General strongly disagreed.32
22. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (LEXIS 1998).
23. See id.  § 25.05.013(e).
24. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
25. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
26. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
27. See id.
28. See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).  The Bureau denied the application based upon a
standing order from the Third Judicial District’s Judge Karl Johnstone to the ef-
fect that marriages could only legally be entered into between one man and one
woman.
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(e) (LEXIS 1998).
30. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI).
31. See id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and for Declaration of the Law of the Case at 7-20, 23-34,
Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI); Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to De-
fendants’ [sic] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-17, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562
CI).
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1. Judge Michalski’s Decision: A Critical Analysis.  Judge
Peter Michalski of the Superior Court of Alaska issued his
memorandum and order on February 27, 1998.33  Judge Michalski
accepted the plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments:
The court finds that marriage, i.e., the recognition of one’s
choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.  The state must
therefore have a compelling interest that supports its decision to
refuse to recognize the exercise of this fundamental right by
those who choose same-sex partners rather than opposite-sex
partners.34
To come to this conclusion, Michalski had to reject the definition
of marriage as a union of a man and a woman.  He openly did so,
claiming that he was not questioning the State’s marriage require-
ments, but rather scrutinizing the State’s definition of marriage.35
In his analysis, Judge Michalski first considered the plaintiffs’
privacy claims.  While noting that the case did not implicate tradi-
tional notions of privacy (the right to be let alone), Michalski held
that the choice of whom one marries is a private matter that the
State cannot interfere with by withholding recognition.36  Michalski
discounted the State’s history and tradition arguments by separat-
ing the concept of marriage from its historical meaning.  The opin-
ion thus adopted the plaintiffs’ novel notion that it is “the decision
itself that is fundamental,” and then stated that “whether the deci-
sion results in a traditional choice or . . . nontraditional choice”
does not matter for purposes of constitutional protection.37  Having
separated marriage from its traditional definition and recast it as
the choice of a life partner, Michalski  found privacy protection for
the choice and bootstrapped that protection into an obligation for
the State to legally recognize that choice.  Judge Michalski found
that the privacy issue was dispositive, and only lightly discussed the
plaintiff’s equal protection claim.38  He then ordered a trial for the
32. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and for Declaration of the Law of the Case, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI); De-
fendants’ Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI).
33. See Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI).
34. Id. at *1.
35. See id. at *2.
36. See id. at *4-5.
37. Id. at *6.
38. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ contention of sex-based classification as
“obvious.”  See id.
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State to show a compelling state interest for its ban on same-sex
marriage.39
The analysis of the right to privacy in Brause confuses toler-
ance and preference.  Relations and conduct may be legally catego-
rized in at least three different ways - as “preferred,” “permitted,”
or “prohibited.”40  Marriage is the classic example of a preferred
relationship.  It is one of the most highly protected, historically fa-
vored relations in the law.  Thus, the claim for same-sex marriage is
not a claim for mere tolerance, but for special preference.  The
principles of tolerance or privacy do not justify legalization of
same-sex marriage because marriage is much more than a permit-
ted, private relation, it is a legally preferred, public status.
The Brause opinion misapplies the precedents upon which it
relies.  The court relies heavily on the Alaska Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in the Breese v. Smith41 and Ravin v. State42 cases, but ignores
the fact that the holdings in those cases must be stretched beyond
recognition to justify a right to same-sex marriage.  In Breese, a fa-
ther sued the principal of an Alaska Junior High School for expel-
ling his son for violating the school’s hair-length requirement.43
The trial court found the requirement reasonable and dismissed the
case, holding that the Alaska Constitution provided no right to
have long hair at school.44  The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed,
but confined its decision to state constitutional issues, specifically
equal protection45 and the constitutional right to a public educa-
tion.46  The court found that article I, section 1 of the Alaska Con-
stitution provided a general right “to be let alone,” although it did
not label this as a right to privacy.47  The court noted Alaska’s alle-
giance to such basic values as the preservation of maximum indi-
vidual choice, protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation
for divergent lifestyles.48  Noting the particularly individual nature
39. See id.  The court did not say if “sexual orientation” merited heightened
scrutiny.
40. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 546-47 (1983).
41. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
42. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
43. See Breese, 501 P.2d at 161.
44. See id. at 164. Though the Alaska Constitution did not then have a privacy
provision, the court addressed the issue of privacy.  See id. at 164 n.11.
45. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
46. See id. art. VII, § 1.
47. Breese, 501 P.2d at 168 (citing Erwin W. Griswold, The Right to be Let
Alone, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 216 (1960)).
48. See id. at 169.
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of personal appearance, the court held that the Alaska Constitu-
tion’s protection of liberty extended to the right of a student to
choose a hairstyle.49  The court then held that the State had not
shown a compelling interest in controlling hair length and invali-
dated the requirement.50  Three years later in Ravin, the Alaska
Supreme Court noted that the State requirement overturned in
Breese potentially interfered with another constitutional right, the
right to a public education.51  Under the regulation, Breese could
not have exercised his right to choose his hair length without jeop-
ardizing his ability to have an education.52
The issues in Brause are easily distinguishable from those at is-
sue in Breese.  First, Breese involved a right to be let alone in what
was an essentially private matter.  The plaintiffs in Brause claimed
that their request also involved a right to be let alone in making the
private decision of whom to marry.53  While the choice of a lifetime
partner may arguably be a private one, the government’s decision
to recognize the marriage relationship has significant public conse-
quences.  Legally recognized marriage requires compliance with
formalities prescribed by statute.  In addition, the State provides
certain accompanying benefits and legal obligations to the mar-
riage relationship.  All of this effectively prevents marriage from
being a wholly private choice.54
Between the time of the Court’s decision in Breese and the
Brause case, the Alaska Constitution had been amended to include
a specific right of privacy.55  In Ravin v. State,56 the Alaska Supreme
Court offered a significant interpretation of the meaning of this
49. See id. at 170.
50. See id. at 172.
51. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 502 (Alaska 1975).
52. See id.  The scope of Breese was further clarified in a case challenging a
court’s contempt citation for an attorney who did not wear a coat and tie to court.
See Friedman v. District Court, 611 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1980).  In that case, the plain-
tiff argued that the Breese decision precluded the court from controlling an attor-
ney’s dress, but the Alaska Supreme Court held that the coat and tie requirement
was reasonable.  See id. at 78.  This suggests that reasonableness might even save a
regulation that affects an arguably private matter like appearance.
53. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
54. In addition, Breese involved the interplay of two constitutional rights, pri-
vacy and education, in such a way that by denying one, the other would be in-
fringed.  See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502.  Brause involves no such mixture of inter-
twined rights.  See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998
WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998).
55. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (amended 1972).
56. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
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provision.  The defendant was charged with illegal possession of
marijuana.57  Ravin attacked the statute criminalizing marijuana
possession on the theory that it violated his constitutional right to
privacy.58  Ravin’s argument was that the privacy provision of the
Alaska Constitution and the right of privacy recognized in the U.S.
Constitution protected a right to possess marijuana for personal
use.59  In examining Ravin’s claims, the court noted the importance
of the inviolability of the home as a major factor in the U.S. Su-
preme Court privacy decisions.60  It also found that the Alaska
Constitution’s privacy provision was aimed at protecting the
home,61 and held that “citizens of the State of Alaska have a basic
right to privacy in their homes under Alaska’s constitution.”62
Having settled the issue of whether possession of marijuana at
one’s own home was protected by the right of privacy, the court
turned to an analysis of the State’s interest in preventing possession
for personal use.  Relying heavily upon scientific studies, the court
concluded that the threat of marijuana possession was only of suffi-
cient interest to the State if it involved marijuana use by a driver,
and that there existed “no adequate justification for the State’s in-
trusion into the citizen’s right to privacy by its prohibition of pos-
session of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the
home.”63
The Ravin case has been extensively relied upon and ex-
plained in subsequent cases.  In the same year that Ravin was de-
cided, the Alaska Supreme Court heard a challenge to another
conviction for possession of marijuana.64  In Belgarde v. State, the
defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana in a public
place in connection with a sale.65  This difference was dispositive for
the court, which noted that the Ravin decision had specifically al-
lowed for prosecution based on the sale or public possession of
marijuana.66  Ravin’s holding is limited by a private/public distinc-
tion: private, home possession of marijuana is constitutionally pro-
tected, but public possession, especially connected to the sale of
57. See id. at 496.
58. See id. at 497.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 502-04.
61. See id. at 503-04.
62. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 511.
64. See Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975).
65. See id. at 207.
66. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
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marijuana, is not.67  The public/private distinction derives from
Ravin’s language that “[w]hen a matter does affect the public, di-
rectly or indirectly, it loses its wholly private character, and can be
made to yield when an appropriate public need is demonstrated.”68
Another important limitation on Ravin’s holding is that there
must not be an important State interest served by the challenged
State action.  In one case following Ravin, the court noted that the
right to privacy did not extend to sexual acts with children.69  An-
other example involved a challenge to a conviction for possession
of cocaine.70  The court noted that part of the justification for the
Ravin decision was the relative harmlessness of marijuana as com-
pared to cocaine, and that the greater State interest in regulating
cocaine use justified prohibiting its possession. 71
Brause’s reliance on the Ravin opinion is misplaced.  Like
Breese, Ravin relies on the essentially private nature of the behav-
ior for which protection is sought.  Cases that have distinguished
Ravin have involved public behavior, such as employee drug use
and writing letters to the governor.72
Brause should have joined this line of cases.  Unlike Ravin,
Brause implicates public behavior and has public consequences.  In
Ravin, the defendant asserted a right to possess marijuana in his
home for personal use, whereas in Brause the plaintiffs sought
public recognition of their relationship (as a marriage).  In addi-
tion, Ravin involved an activity that the court found to have little
impact on society, whereas Brause’s radical redefinition of mar-
riage has the potential for significant impact on public life.  While
home marijuana use may be a private pastime that arguably trig-
gers no State involvement, marriage is a fundamental societal insti-
tution in which the State has a great interest, and marital status is
67. The importance of this distinction is strengthened by other cases where
Ravin was unsuccessfully used to challenge convictions for possession of mari-
juana related to its sale.  See, e.g., Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 179, 180 (Alaska 1977).
68. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.  See also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Ju-
dicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986) (rejecting a privacy claim asserted to pre-
vent the production of a letter written to the governor, which was held to involve a
public matter); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska
1989) (ruling that two employees discharged for not submitting to a drug test were
not protected by Ravin’s holding because Ravin involved a prosecution for activity
taking place in the home).
69. See Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977).
70. See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
71. See id. at 21.
72. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989);
Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
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inherently a public status that triggers extensive government bene-
fits and protections.
2.  The Petition for Review.  After the Brause decision, the
State immediately petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for
review.  The State argued that popular disagreement with the
court’s decision, as well as the likelihood that a trial would be
contentious and inflammatory, warranted immediate review.73  The
State argued that the lower court’s decision was erroneous because
it (1) constituted judicial legislation, (2) wrongly construed the
Alaska Constitution as providing a right to same-sex marriage
contrary to the history and intent of the constitution, and (3)
blithely held that the marriage law constituted sex discrimination.74
The Supreme Court declined the Petition for Review.75  In the
meantime, the people and their elected representatives took mat-
ters into their own hands.
III.  THE PASSAGE OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
A constitution is a negotiated settlement between citizens of
often deeply differing viewpoints.  Together, the people of a geo-
graphic region strive to agree upon a charter for the political com-
munity that will govern them.  This charter represents a people’s
fundamental judgment about government’s proper structure and
role, both in itself and in relationship to individual persons and so-
cial institutions.76  The hope is then that, from this baseline, politi-
cal issues can be adequately resolved within a constitutional
framework, so that citizens and institutions are not consumed with
constant debate and uncertainty about the legitimate and illegiti-
mate powers of their government.
73. See Petition for Review at 3-5, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562).
74. See id. at 6-15.
75. See High Court Declines Same-Sex Case, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June
6, 1998, at D1 (“The Alaska Supreme Court has declined to review a judge’s deci-
sion in an ongoing case challenging the state ban on same-sex marriage.  Theoreti-
cally, that clears the way for a superior court trial on the challenge, but voters may
decide the matter before the courts can.”).
76. See, e.g., DONALD LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
13 (1988) (“Every constitution uses principles of design for achieving the kind of
life envisioned by its authors, and the principles will vary according to that vi-
sion.”); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO 109 (1994) (“[A]t the heart of constitutional argument is
political controversy about democracy, about what it can be and what it should
be.”).
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At times, however, the meaning of a constitutional order is it-
self called into question.  For various reasons, founding principles
become a matter of explicit debate in the political arena.  At such
moments, proposals are often set forward to amend the basic char-
ter of a government.
Constitutional crises have often centered upon the courts.
Sometimes these crises have been occasioned when a court upholds
a law, such as in Plessy v. Ferguson.77  Other times fundamental de-
bates are triggered when a court overturns a law, as in Roe v.
Wade,78 when the Supreme Court struck down State legislation re-
stricting abortion, or in Brown v. Board of Education,79 when the
Court overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine.  It is even pos-
sible for a court to trigger a widespread crisis without fully adjudi-
cating a case.  That is one way of describing what happened when
Judge Michalski issued his opinion in Brause.  Technically, that
opinion did not officially decide the fate of Alaska’s marriage law,
but only set a novel standard to be used by the trial court in its con-
sideration of the marriage statute.80
From the point of view of those who supported Judge Michal-
ski’s opinion, the court was boldly and legitimately exercising its
role as supreme interpreter of the Alaska State Constitution.81  To
opponents of the decision, however, the Court, whose only role was
to interpret the Alaska Constitution, had exceeded the constitu-
tional order.82  The people would have to take matters into their
own hands to correct the court’s misguided and illegitimate effort
to impose an unprecedented social experiment.  The people would
have to clarify the genuine meaning of the Alaska Constitution,
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); see infra Part III.D.
81. See, e.g., Letters From the People (Judge Just Followed the Law),
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,  Apr. 6, 1998, at B7.
82. See Mary Ann Pease & Karsten Rodvik, Preventing Redefinition of Mar-
riage Doesn’t Hurt Anyone, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1998, at H4.  Pro-
fessor Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard has described “the habits and attitudes of
judges with grandiose visions of judicial authority, practitioners eager to blaze new
trails to the nation’s crowded courthouses, and legal scholars yearning to be phi-
losopher-kings and -queens.”  MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS 282-83 (1994).
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thereby reasserting themselves as the authors of their Constitu-
tion.83
Framed in this way, the debate over same-sex marriage and
the Marriage Amendment would become a debate not only about
what marriage is, but also a debate about who should decide the
answer: the people of Alaska or their courts?
In a matter as weighty as an amendment to a Constitution, a
careful analysis of the process, content, and intent behind the
amendment is critical.  Where a state constitutional amendment is
involved, it obviously may be challenged on federal constitutional
grounds.
With the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Ev-
ans,84 the possibility of overturning state constitutional amend-
ments arguably related to controversies over homosexuality has
come to the fore.  Romer overturned Colorado’s Amendment 2,
which invalidated local “sexual orientation” anti-discrimination or-
dinances.  The Court characterized Amendment 2 as motivated by
“animosity” towards homosexual persons.85  Because Amendment
2 neither served a valid purpose nor advanced it by legitimate
means, the Court concluded that the amendment failed even ra-
tional basis review.86
As Section IV discusses in detail, opponents of the Alaska
Marriage Amendment cite Romer for the proposition that the Mar-
riage Amendment must likewise be invalidated under the Federal
Constitution.  Amendment supporters argue that Romer is inappli-
cable.
This section examines each stage of the amendment process to
explore whether Romer applies to the Marriage Amendment.  We
conclude that the amendment process demonstrates that the goal
of the Marriage Amendment is to reaffirm marriage, against
Brause, without animus toward any class of Alaska citizens.  The
process of considering the Marriage Amendment involved substan-
tial public debate in which both sides were truly heard and fairly
represented.
A. Approval by the Legislature
An amendment to the Alaska Constitution requires a two-
thirds vote by each chamber of the Legislature, and approval by a
83. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2: “All political power is inherent in the peo-
ple.  All government originates with the people, is founded upon their will only,
and is instituted solely for the good of the people as a whole.”
84. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
85. Id. at 634.  For the text of Amendment 2, see infra note 264.
86. See id. at 624.
DUNCAN.FMT.FINAL 11/17/99  4:15 PM
1999] ALASKA MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 227
majority of the voters at the next general election.87  While the re-
quirements are basic, the journey from introduction to ratification
can be anything but simple.  Here we narrate the progress of the
amendment through the topsy-turvy legislative process.
1. The Senate.  The reaction to Judge Michalski’s decision in
Brause was extraordinarily swift.  On March 2, 1998, the first
business day following Judge Michalski’s decision, the Senate
Health, Education and Social Services Committee (the “HESS
Committee”) introduced two resolutions.  The first, S.C.R. 25,88
urged an appeal and an expeditious decision in the Brause case.89
Senate Majority Leader Robin Taylor stated that:
[i]t is apparent that our Judiciary needs further clarification on
fundamental values.  Marriage has been the foundation of civili-
zation for thousands of years and in cultures around the world.
Marriage is the most important social institution in our society.
The state has a . . . principle interest in preserving and protecting
the special status of marriage, regardless of religious beliefs.90
Taylor’s statement also announced that the HESS Committee
would be introducing a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Alaska Constitution.  As introduced, S.J.R. 42 read as follows:
Section 15.  Marriage Contract.  Each marriage contract in this
State may be entered into only by one man and one woman.
The legislature may, by law, enact additional requirements re-
lating to marriage.91
The Senate Judiciary Committee scheduled a hearing for
March 9.  The lead sponsor of the resolution, Senator Loren Le-
man, Vice-Chair of the HESS Committee, issued a statement on
the eve of the hearing.  Describing the flaws of Brause, as he saw
them, he concluded that “[b]ecause recognition of same-sex mar-
riages raises the most profound cultural and legal issues, it is only
appropriate that the issue be decided by voters, as S.J.R. 42 will
allow.  It is not appropriate for one unelected and unaccountable
judge to set social policy for the entire State of Alaska.”92
87. See ALASKA CONST. art. 13, § 1.
88. S.C.R. 25, 20th Leg., 1st Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
89. See Senate J. 2705, 20th Leg., 1st Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).  The Resolu-
tion passed the Senate Judiciary Committee 4-1 on March 10th, and passed the
Senate 20-0 on March 12th.  See Senate J. 2807, 2847, 20th Leg., 1st Legis. Sess.
(Alaska 1998).
90. Press Release of the Office of the Majority Leader (Mar. 2, 1998) (on file
with authors).
91. S.J. Res. 42, Senate J. 2701, 20th Leg., 1st Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
92. Senate Committee on Health, Education, and Social Services, Sponsor
Statement - Senate Joint Resolution 42 (Mar. 9, 1998).
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The first witness at the hearing was John Gaguine, the Assis-
tant Attorney General handling the Brause litigation for the De-
partment of Law.93  He came with no prepared statement, and no
comments to make on the revised version of the resolution.  The
Chairman asked him, “In other words, is this something appropri-
ate to place on the ballot, and is it something that the people of the
state should vote on, and is it in conflict with any provisions of the
constitution?”  Gaguine was reticent: “I do not want to speak for
the Administration on this.  As I said, I’m just here litigating it.”
But then he added, in simple terms, what would be repeated and
debated by many witnesses and citizens later that day and in the
coming months: “This amendment, it seems to me, would moot the
litigation, and I think that’s the intent of it.”94
The lead witness in support of S.J.R. 42 was Lynn D. Wardle,
Professor of Law at Brigham Young University and Secretary-
General of the International Society of Family Law.  He surveyed
the worldwide legal status of same-sex couples, noted the unprece-
dented (and in his opinion flawed) nature of Brause, contrasted
Brause with the traditional understanding of marriage in American
law, and defended the constitutionality of the resolution.95
Testimony was subsequently received from across the State.96
Ten citizens opposed the Marriage Amendment, and two sup-
ported it.97  Opponents claimed the Amendment was an attack on
93. Gaguine’s testimony can be found in the Draft Verbatim Testimony on
S.J.Res. 42 before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 9, 1998, Tape 98-15,
Side A (Alaska 1998) at 4-6.
94. Id. at 5-6 (question by Chairman Taylor and Response by Asst. Attorney
General Gaguine).
95. See id. at 6-11 (live testimony of Professor Wardle); see also Written
Statement of Professor Lynn D. Wardle in Support of S.J.R. No. 42 and S.C.R.
No. 25, Submitted for Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on March 9,
1998, 20th Legis., 1st Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998) (on file with authors, also submit-
ted as Exhibit 4 to the Alaska Legislature’s Brief).
96. A large crowd had gathered, both in the hearing room, and in the Legisla-
tive Information Offices (“LIOs”) across the State, where citizens hoped to offer
testimony by teleconference.  Senator Ellis, an opponent of the resolution, insisted
that Chairman Taylor make time for them to be heard.  The Chairman counted
about 30 witnesses signed up at the hearing room, plus “on the LIOs it looks like
probably another 30 to 40 on top of that.”  Draft Verbatim Testimony on S.J.R. 42
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 9, 1998, Tape 98-15, Side A at
11-12 (Alaska 1998) (Exchange between Senators Ellis and Taylor) (on file with
authors).
97. See Draft Verbatim Testimony on S.J.R. 42, supra note 96, at 12.  Those
testifying against the amendment were Donald Cecil and Sara Beosser from the
Statewide Committee for Equality; Marsha Buck, co-chair of Parents, Families,
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homosexuals, that it was unnecessary, and that it would limit con-
stitutional rights.98  They described Alaska as a land of “freedom”
and the state constitution as the guarantor of privacy.99  Most op-
ponents concluded by urging the Legislature to leave the question
to the courts.100
Following the testimony, the Committee adopted the follow-
ing revised version of the resolution on a 4-1 vote, over the strong
objections of Senator Ellis, who insisted that not enough people
had testified, and that in any case, the issue belonged in the
courts.101
Section 25.  Marriage.  To be valid or recognized in this State, a
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.  No
provision of This [sic] Constitution may be interpreted to require
the State to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of
the same sex.  Additional requirements related to marriage may
be established to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska.102
On March 10, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out
the proposed text and sent it to the Senate Finance Committee.103
Finance referred the resolution to a subcommittee, which subse-
quently held two public hearings via teleconference for persons un-
able to testify in person.104
and Friends of Lesbians and Gays; Pam Northrip and Wilson Valentine from the
Commission for Human Rights; Peter Pinney, Ellen Twiname, Michael Jones,
Rev. Howard Bess, and Elizabeth Dodd.  Those testifying in favor of the amend-
ment were: Michael Johnstone from Caruso Ministries and Tom Gord from Chris-
tian Coalition of Alaska.  See id. at 12-35.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 17.
100. See id.
101. See Draft Verbatim Testimony on S.J.R. 42, supra note 96, Side B at 39-44.
Senators Parnell, Pearce, Miller and Taylor voted “yes,” and Senator Ellis voted
“no.”  See id. at 44.  The revised version was adopted as presented in the hearing.
102. Id. at 36.
103. See Senate J. 2807, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
104. See Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
Relating to Marriage: Hearing on S.J.R. 42 Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 20th
Legis., 2d Legis. Sess., Mar. 24, 1998, 9:15 a.m., Verbatim Transcript, Tape 98-93,
Side A at 2 (Alaska 1998) (on file with authors).  The Subcommittee included
Senators Adams, Donley, Phillips and Torgerson.  It held hearings on March 31 at
1:00 p.m. (for South Central Alaska) and 7:00 p.m. (for Sitka, Kodiak and Haines),
and April 1 at 7 a.m. (for Barrow, Bethel, Delta Junction, Dillingham, Fairbanks,
Kotzebue, Nome and Unalakleet).  At the first public hearing held on the after-
noon of March 31, the Subcommittee took testimony by remote from Homer,
Kenai, and Mat-Su.  See Minutes, Senate Fin. Subcomm., Mar. 31, 1998, 1:00 p.m.,
Verbatim Transcript (on file with authors).  Thirty speakers spoke in favor of the
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It is interesting to note that Howard Bess and Elizabeth Dodd
both spoke in opposition to the amendment during these hear-
ings.105  After the Amendment passed, both filed suit to try to en-
Amendment.  Of these, 29 spoke as individuals, and one spoke on behalf of an or-
ganization (Guardians of Family Rights).  Sixteen speakers spoke against the
amendment.  Of these, 15 spoke as individuals and one spoke on behalf of an or-
ganization (Alaska Civil Liberties Union).  The hearing resumed on the evening
of the 31st and included testimony from Sitka and Juneau.  See Minutes, Senate
Fin. Subcom., Mar. 31, 1998, 7:00 p.m., Draft Verbatim Transcript (on file with
authors).  At this session, 23 speakers spoke in favor of the Amendment, 22
speaking as individuals and one speaking on behalf of an organization (the
Knights of Columbus).  Forty-four speakers opposed the amendment, 37 speaking
as individuals and seven speaking for organizations  (the Committee for Equality;
Southeast Alaska Gay and Lesbian Alliance; Parents and Friends of Lesbians and
Gays; National Association of Social Workers; Juneau Human Rights Commis-
sion; Alaska Women’s Lobby; and the Alaska Civil Liberties Union).  The final
hearing on the morning of April 1 received remote testimony from Fairbanks,
Dillingham, Barrow and Delta Junction.  See Minutes, Senate Fin. Subcomm.,
Apr. 1, 1998, 7:00 a.m., Draft Verbatim Transcript at 1-3 (on file with authors).
This session included nine speakers in support of the amendment, all speaking as
individuals, and 29 speakers against the amendment, 28 speaking as individuals
and one speaking on behalf of an organization (Parents and Friends of Lesbians
and Gays).
105. See Minutes, Senate Fin. Subcomm., Mar. 31, 1998, 1:00 p.m., Verbatim
Transcript at 26-27.(Alaska 1998); Mar. 31, 1998, 7:00 p.m., Verbatim Transcript at
41-42 (Dodd and Alaska Civil Liberties Union) (Alaska 1998).  Opponents of the
amendment were much more likely to base their arguments on the perceived mo-
tivation of those with whom they disagreed.  Among the many arguments made in
favor of the amendment were the following: by definition, marriage is between a
man and a woman; the redefinition of marriage should be left to the people of
Alaska to decide; the recognition of same-sex marriage might have a slippery-
slope effect leading to recognition of relationships such as polygamy; children are
benefited by traditional marriage; the amendment was necessary to correct judi-
cial activism; and allowing same-sex marriage in Alaska would create conflict with
the laws of other states.  Among the arguments voiced by the opposition were:
same-sex couples should have access to the benefits of marriage; the amendment
would be divisive, creating an atmosphere of hatred, and would constitutionalize
discrimination; the amendment violates church/state separation principles; the
courts should be free to rule on the issue; the amendment would infringe privacy
rights; the ban on same-sex marriage is analogous to discredited anti-
miscegenation statutes; permitting same-sex marriage would benefit the economy;
the Legislature should wait until the Alaska Supreme Court decides the Brause
case; the motivations for a couple entering same-sex marriage are similar for a
heterosexual couple; and homosexual couples should be permitted to order their
lives the same way heterosexual couples do.  It is important to note that “relig-
ious” arguments were made on both sides (besides arguments by opponents that
the amendment was motivated by religious sentiments).
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join the Alaska Legislature from placing S.J.R 42 on the ballot.
The lawsuit contended that the ballot item violated regulations on
how items should appear on a ballot and that the amendment
would violate the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.106
On April 2, the full Finance Committee scheduled a final
hearing to act on the resolution.  Senator Leman attempted to re-
spond to public criticisms.  “To begin with,” he stated, “it was re-
peatedly suggested that the motivation behind this resolution is to
discriminate against homosexuals, to deny them rights and protec-
tions they deserve under the law.  This is not true.”107  Insisting that
a response to Brause was the issue, and nothing more, the Senator
argued:
Judge Michalski is attempting to redefine something that is im-
pervious to redefinition . . . . Gravity exists.  We cannot eliminate
gravity by passing a law.  Our species was created with two gen-
ders.  We cannot change that reality by passing a law . . . . Judge
Michalski and I have at least one thing in common: neither of us
can redefine marriage.  I accept that reality.  He does not.  And
that is why we are here today.108
During the meeting, Michael Pauley, staff aide to Senator Le-
man, explained the Judiciary Committee’s revised version of the
resolution.109  Before a final vote on the text, Senator Adams made
the following passionate and colorful statement against the Mar-
riage Amendment:
[The resolution] lacks, I believe . . . respect and compassion for
people in the State of Alaska.  I am a married man, six kids, and
a Quaker.  And I listened to the testimony from some of the re-
ligious groups.  But I believe that before we pass something like
this . . . we should wait for the Courts to take it . . . .  I thought
we took a sworn oath of office that we would protect the Consti-
tution.  That every Alaskan should have equal protection, equal
treatment.  But we’re not doing it with this piece of legisla-
tion. . . .  I play poker once a week.  I play cribbage.  I go to the
horse races.  So, I love to gamble.  After one hundred and
twenty-one days I like to drink.  But I do not pass that on to the
people.  And, as a normal human being . . . I do lust for certain
106. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Bess
v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska 1999); Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Dodd v. Ulmer, No. 3AN-
98-8113 CIV, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska 1999).
107. Remarks of Senator Loren Leman re: S.J.R. 42, Senate Fin. Comm. 1
(Apr. 2, 1998) (on file with authors).
108. Id. at 3.
109. Minutes, Senate Fin. Comm., Apr. 2, 1998, Tapes 98-109, Side B and 98-
110, Side A, at 4-6 (Alaska 1998) (remarks of Michael Polley [sic]) (on file with
authors).
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things.  A new car, and perhaps something beautiful of the oppo-
site sex.  So, there is nobody that is perfect in the Legislature.
An[d] why are we trying to pass on morality?  I think morality
should not be a Legislative matter and we’re trying to do this.
And I think that is wrong.110
Following these remarks, the Senate Finance Committee voted 6-1
to support the resolution.111
On April 16, the resolution came to the Senate floor.  Senator
Leman repeated his previous arguments.112  He also added a per-
sonal note: “[I]n light of the messages that I have received, and the
suggestion by some that I don’t understand their lifestyle, that
somehow I’m motivated by hate or fear, I just want to share some-
thing from my own past, and from my own family.”113  He then dis-
closed that several members of his extended family, and friends of
his, are homosexual.  He also mentioned an acquaintance who had
been homosexual “but he abandoned that lifestyle.”114  He stated
that “even when we disagree with the moral choices that another
person makes, our relationship can still be rooted in love.  How-
ever, it is false compassion to suggest that tolerance requires us to
publicly recognize and sanction and confer special benefits on ho-
mosexual relationships.”115  The Senator closed by quoting Judge
Kleinfeld from the Ninth Circuit: “The Founding Fathers did not
establish the United States as a democratic republic so that elected
officials would decide trivia, while all great questions would be de-
cided by the judiciary.”116
There were other moments, however, when the debate threat-
ened to descend into outright farce.  Senator Ellis (D-Anchorage)
proposed an amendment that would have added the Ten Com-
110. Id. at 10 (remarks of Senator Adams).
111. The words “The Legislature may enact” were added to the front of the
third sentence, and “may be established” were deleted from the end of the sen-
tence.  See id. at 9.  In addition, the proposed location of the amendment was
shifted from art. 12 to art. 1, placing the amendment in the section on basic rights.
See id. at 3.  Senators Torgerson, Parnell, Donley, Phillips, Pearce, and Sharp
voted “Yes.”  Senator Adams voted “No.”  See id.  at 11.  The resolution was offi-
cially reported out on April 6.  See Senate J. 3158, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess.
(Alaska 1998).
112. Senate Floor Statement in Support of S.J.R. 42, Senator Loren Leman (R-
Anchorage), Thursday, Apr. 16, 1998, Juneau, Alaska 3 (on file with authors).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), rev’d by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997)).
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mandments to the Constitution.  He explained that just as a Ten
Commandments Amendment would be inappropriate, so would a
Marriage Amendment.117  His proposal was rejected.  The Marriage
Amendment bill then passed by the margin of fourteen Republi-
cans versus six Democrats. 118  Having met the magic number of
fourteen votes, the proposal was approved.119
2. The House.  The House received the proposed
Amendment on April 18 and, as in the Senate, referred it to the
Judiciary and Finance Committees.120  On April 27, the House
Judiciary Committee held a marathon hearing at which Senator
Leman and 103 live and remote witnesses testified.121
In his opening presentation, Senator Leman emphasized “the
great impact that this could have if Alaska engages in redefining
what marriage is, it would have an impact on federal law and also it
117. See Senate J. 3297-98, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
118. See Senate J. 3300, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).  The Senators
voting yes were Donley, Green, Halford, Kelly, Leman, Miller, Parnell, Pearce,
Phillips, Sharp, Taylor, Torgerson, Ward, and Wilken.  Voting no were Adams,
Duncan, Ellis, Hoffman, Lincoln, and Mackie.  Senator Adams then moved for
reconsideration.  See id.  On the following day, the Senate passed the resolution
again by the same margin and transmitted it to the House.  See id. at 3334, 3346.
119. Liz Ruskin of the Anchorage Daily News summed it up with typical jour-
nalistic flair: “After two hours of passionate debate that turned from the Bible to
barnyard animals, the Alaska Senate voted Thursday for a constitutional ballot
measure that would ban same-sex marriage.”  Liz Ruskin, Senate: 1 man, 1
woman, Marriage-defining ballot measure OK’d, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr.
17, 1998, at A1.
120. See House J. 3071, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
121. See House Judiciary Standing Committee, Apr. 27, 1998, 1:18 PM, Draft
Verbatim Transcript, Tapes 98-71 Side B to 98-74, Side A.  In total, 78 citizens tes-
tified against the resolution, and 24 testified in support of it.  See id. at 2-15.  The
Witness Register allowed citizens to sign up as testifying “in support of,” “in op-
position to,” or “on” the proposed Amendment.  Only six persons signed “on,”
and the transcript clearly shows that three were in favor of the Amendment, and
three were against it.  Of the 79 opponents, 10 represented organizations (Alaska
Civil Liberties Union, Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (“P-FLAG”)
Juneau, P-FLAG Fairbanks, the Alaska State Chapter of Social Workers, the
Committee for Equality, the Southeast Alaska Gay and Lesbian Alliance, the
Alaska Women’s Lobby, the University of Alaska-Southeast student government,
the Social Action Committee of the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship of Fair-
banks, and Alaska State League of Women Voters).  Eighteen of these opponents
also expressed religious opinions or identified themselves by religious affiliation.
In contrast, of the 24 supporters, only one represented an organization (Tom
Gordy, a Baptist minister representing Christian Coalition of Alaska).  Ten ex-
pressed religious views.
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could have an impact on the other states.”122  He was questioned
about the timing of the amendment in relationship to the ongoing
Brause case.  Representative Ethan Berkowitz asked, “Do you feel
that there is an inability [on the part of the State] to make a com-
pelling case?”  Senator Leman answered “no,” but added that he
was wary of “the judges who, there may be a few of them, they [sic]
may come to different conclusions.”  If judges go awry, he contin-
ued, “the only way that we can regain the voice of the people is to
take this to the people.”123
Representative Berkowitz added, “[I]t seems to me that we
might be jumping the gun a little bit in this case since the courts
haven’t made a final determination.”124  Representative Eric Croft
addressed a similar question to the Senator: “[Imagine] Judge
Michalski moved that the compelling interest test was met and that
there was no right [to same-sex marriage] under the Alaska Consti-
tution.  Should we still have this on the ballot?”125  Senator Leman
responded to both questions by arguing that if the Marriage
Amendment were passed now, the Brause case would be over.
However, without a Marriage Amendment, the Brause case could
drag on, and it would not be completed without appeals and the
expenditures of massive time, energy and money.  Even then, he
argued, a Marriage Amendment could still be necessary.126
Between April 30 and May 10, the Marriage Amendment
moved from the House Judiciary Committee to the House floor
with only one further revision.127  On the eve of the third reading,
the House substitute text read as follows:
122. Id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Leman).
123. Id. at 17. (exchange between Rep. Berkowitz and Sen. Leman).
124. Id. (statement of Rep. Berkowitz).
125. Id. at 19 (question of Rep. Croft).
126. See id. at 18-20 (responses of Sen. Leman).
127. On April 30, the House Judiciary approved the Marriage Amendment on
a 4-1 vote.  See House J. 3360, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).  Represen-
tatives Green, Porter, Rokeberg and James voted “Yes,” and Representative
Croft voted “No.”  See id.  It was then referred to the House Finance Committee,
which quickly and unanimously approved it on May 5.  See id. at 3518.  The Com-
mittee Members included Representatives Therriault, Hanley, Mulder, Martin,
Davis, and Kelly.  See id.  From there it proceeded to the House Rules Commit-
tee.  On May 8th, a motion to withdraw the resolution from committee failed 34-1,
with 5 absent.  See id. at 3657.  On May 9, the Rules Committee first put it on the
House calendar, then returned it to committee and revised it by deleting the third
sentence.  See id. at 3704.  The revised version was unanimously approved by
Rules Committee and put back on the House calendar for the next day.  See id. at
3730-31 (Committee members Williams, Porter, Phillips, and Kott voting affirma-
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Section 25.  Marriage.  To be valid or recognized in this State, a
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.  No
provision of this constitution may be interpreted to require the
State to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of the
same sex.128
The final debates on the House floor took place on May 11.
Representative Con Bunde complained that the issue had caused
him to lose sleep.  He expressed the concern that having the Mar-
riage Amendment on the ballot would create a “political shouting
match.”  While not willing to endorse same-sex marriage, he said
that he opposed the amendment because it was about “fear and
hate.”129  Representative Scott Ogan told of a homosexual relative
and reassured other members that while he was voting without
malice, he was voting for the amendment.130
Representative Joe Green also mentioned a positive experi-
ence he had had with a same-sex couple, but argued that it was
wrong to confuse the traditional definition of marriage by extend-
ing that status to other relationships.131  Representative Davies then
argued that the appropriate question was why same-sex couples
could not have all of the benefits of married couples.  He answered
the question by arguing that there was no reason for disparate
treatment.132
In the same vein, Representative Eric Croft characterized the
amendment as “odd” and charged that it denied rights to Alaska
citizens.  He thought the amendment was analogous to anti-
miscegenation laws and worried that someday the State would be
embarrassed by the provision.133  Representative Ethan Berkowitz
then characterized the amendment as a violation of equal protec-
tion,134 and Representative Irene Nicholia charged that it promoted
“hate.”135  Before the debate closed, however, Representative Ogan
responded to these sweeping allegations.  Far from being separable
from law, he argued, moral judgment is indispensable to all law-
tively).  The resolution passed in its second reading by unanimous consent and
was set for its third reading.  See id. at 3737.
128. S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998).
129. House of Representatives, May 11, 1998, Draft Verbatim Transcript (on
file with authors) (statement of Rep. Bunde).
130. See id. (statement of Rep. Ogan).
131. See id. (statement of Rep. Green).
132. See id. (statement of Rep. Davies).
133. See id. (statement of Rep. Kroft).
134. See id. (statement of Rep. Berkowitz).
135. Id. (statement of Rep. Nicholia).
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making.136  After the debate, the revised amendment passed the
House 28-12, one more vote than needed.137
After passage, press reports noted that the amendment’s op-
ponents were disappointed.  They accused the legislators of making
backroom deals to allow the measure to pass and of acting on fear
or hatred.138  Senator Leman and the amendment’s supporters at-
tributed the victory to the Legislature’s having grasped that mar-
riage is worth protecting, and that the question of same-sex mar-
riage was an issue that should be decided by the people rather than
the courts.139
B. Pre-Ballot Litigation
As soon as the amendment passed, Robert Wagstaff, attorney
for the Brause plaintiffs, announced plans to file suit to prevent the
amendment from being voted on by the people.140
1. In Superior Court.  Wagstaff filed suit on July 17, 1998.141
The lead plaintiff in the challenge was Reverend Howard Bess,
pastor of the Church of the Covenant in Wasilla, Alaska.  Bess
claimed that defending religious liberty was the motivation for the
suit.  Bess argued that the amendment constituted a codification of
136. See id. (statement of Rep. Ogan).
137. See House J. 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998). Representa-
tives voting for the amendment were Austerman, Barnes, Cowdery, Davis, Dyson,
Foster, Green, Hanley, Hodgins, Hudson, Ivan, James, Kelly, Kohring, Kott, Mar-
tin, Masek, Moses, Mulder, Ogan, Phillips, Porter, Rokeborg, Ryan, Sanders,
Therriault, Vezey and Williams.  Representatives voting against were Berkowitz,
Brice, Bunde, Croft, Davies, Elton, Grussendorf, Joule, Kemplen, Kookesh, Ku-
bina and Nicholia.  The following day, it passed on a motion for reconsideration
by the same margin and was transmitted to the Senate.  See id. at 3888-89, 3942.
The Senate quickly concurred with the House’s version.  See Senate J. 4157, 20th
Leg., 2d Sess. Legis. (Alaska 1998).  The concurrence was by the same vote as
earlier, 14-6.  The resolution was subsequently transmitted to Governor Knowles,
although he had no constitutional power to approve or disapprove of it.  See id. at
4248.
138. See Liz Ruskin, Marriage Measure on Ballot; Voters to Decide if Same-Sex
Unions OK, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 12, 1998, at A1.
139. See id.
140. See High Court Declines Same-Sex Case, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June
6, 1998, at D1 (“Meanwhile, Wagstaff said he plans to go back to court in a bid to
keep the amendment off the ballot.  ‘There are legal proceedings that are going to
be brought to stop that, because we believe it is invalid under the federal constitu-
tion,’ Wagstaff said.”).
141. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Bess
v. Ulmer, No. 3AN-98-7776 CIV (Alaska Super. Ct. July 17, 1998).
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the religious convictions of the Legislature.142  The other plaintiffs
were Brause plaintiffs Jay Brause and Gene Dugan.143  To the press,
Wagstaff contended that the amendment violated separation of
powers principles (by “tell[ing] judges how they can interpret the
constitution”), and hinted that the Legislature was driven by
improper religious motivations.144  Wagstaff also argued that the
ballot title and summary did not reflect what the plaintiffs
considered to be a “true and impartial” description of the
amendment, and asserted standing on that ground.  In their
complaint, the plaintiffs argued that a “true and impartial”
description of the amendment would be entitled “Constitutional
Amendment Denying Homosexuals Fundamental Rights”145 and
the summary would read as follows:
This measure will change the Equal Protection, Civil Rights &
Privacy Clauses of the Alaska Constitution so as to make them
inapplicable to homosexual same sex relationships and marriage.
Marriages will be limited to one man and one woman and no
provision of the Constitution may be read to require the state to
recognize or permit same sex marriages or relationships.  The
State will have the power to prohibit and penalize any same sex
relationships and marriages.146
This language was quite different from the title and summary of-
fered by the Lieutenant Governor:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT LIMITING MARRIAGE
This measure would amend the Declaration of Rights section of
the Alaska Constitution to limit marriage.  The amendment
would say that to be valid, a marriage may exist only between
one man and one woman.  It would also say that no provision of
the Alaska Constitution may be interpreted by a court to require
the state to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of
the same sex.147
The Bess plaintiffs argued in their complaint that the existing
summary was unfair because the amendment would deny existing
rights to same-sex couples,148 that it violated the single subject rule
because it dealt with both marriage and the power of the courts,149
142. See Liz Ruskin, Marriage Vote Challenged; Couples Sue Over Same-Sex
Ballot Measure, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 18, 1998, at A1.
143. See id.
144. Id. (“‘Let’s not kid ourselves.  They’re on a divine mission . . . . If the con-
stitution stops it, they’re out to change the constitution.’”).
145. Id.
146. Complaint at 3, Bess (No. 3AN-98-7776 CI).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 4-5.
149. See id. at 5-6.
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and that under Romer v. Evans150 the amendment violated the U.S.
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause by denying basic rights to
homosexuals.151  The plaintiffs asked the court to invalidate the
summary language and enjoin the amendment from appearing on
the November 1998 ballot.152
The Alaska Civil Liberties Union also sought to remove the
amendment from the ballot.153  Plaintiff Elizabeth Dodd, President
of the board of directors of the ACLU, officially distanced the suit
from the issue of same-sex “marriage,” arguing that the amend-
ment was an improper revision of the constitution and a discrimi-
natory provision.154  The ACLU alleged that the amendment vio-
lated the “single subject rule,” because it addressed both marriages
performed in the State and marriages contracted outside the
State.155  The amendment, it argued, is actually a revision because it
addressed these two subjects and affected the constitutional rights
of homosexual persons.156  While the Constitution can be amended
by the people of the State, the ACLU argued, it can only be revised
by constitutional convention.157  Therefore, the amendment
amounted to an improper “revision” of the Alaska Constitution.158
Amendment supporters countered that both challenges to the
amendment were motivated by a realization that the amendment
would pass if the people had the opportunity to vote on it.159  The
Alaska Legislature responded with a suit of its own, also claiming
that the language used by the State in its description of the ballot
initiative was inaccurate.160  The language preferred by the Legisla-
ture was the Lieutenant Governor’s original language:
150. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text for ini-
tial discussion of Romer, and infra notes 263-295 for a more extensive discussion
of whether or not Romer is relevant to the Marriage Amendment.
151. See Complaint at 6, Bess (No. 3AN-98-7776 CI).
152. See id. at 6-7.
153. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction, Dodd v.
Ulmer, No. 3AN-98-8114 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 30, 1998); see also Rosanne
Pagano, ACLU Challenges Referendum on Same-Sex Marriage, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, July 31, 1998, at B1.
154. The revision argument was made by the ACLU and the discrimination ar-
gument was made by Vic Fischer, a former state senator.  See Pagano, supra note
153.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Complaint at 3-4, Dodd (No. 3AN-98-8114 CI).
159. See id.
160. See First Amended Complaint at 4,  Legislature v. Ulmer, No.
3AN-98-7972 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 27, 1998).
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON MARRIAGE
This measure would add an amendment to the Alaska Constitu-
tion on marriage.  The amendment would say that marriage must
be between one man and one woman to be valid or recognized in
the State.  It would also say that no provision of the Alaska Con-
stitution may be read to require the State to recognize or permit
same-sex marriages.161
The Legislature argued that the existing language was partial and
untrue because it stated that the Amendment would “limit” mar-
riage.  Since no state or country currently understands marriage to
include same-sex couples, excluding same-sex couples cannot be
fairly called a “limitation.”162
All three parties moved for summary judgment, the cases were
consolidated and assigned to Anchorage Superior Court Judge Sen
Tan, and a hearing was held on August 30.163  At that time, Judge
Tan ruled orally from the bench that the amendment should stay
on the ballot, that the description written by the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor was adequate, and that the Romer claims were not ripe.164
His final judgment was entered on September 8, 1998.165
2. Before the Alaska Supreme Court.  The Bess and Dodd
plaintiffs then filed an emergency appeal with the Alaska Supreme
Court.  They repeated their arguments that the amendment related
to multiple subjects and constituted an improper “revision” of the
Constitution.166  The Bess plaintiffs also pressed a “single
amendment” rule, arguing that because three amendments were on
the ballot for November 1998, the Legislature was improperly
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 4-5.
163. See Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 13-
14, Bess v. Ulmer, No. 3AN-98-7776 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 27, 1998); Opposi-
tion to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 12, Dodd v. Ulmer, No.
3AN-98-8114 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1998); Memorandum in Support of
the Alaska Legislature’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Opposition to the
Bess Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Partial Opposition to Ulmer’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Legislature v. Ulmer, No. 3AN-98-7972 CI
(Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1998).
164. See Transcript of Oral Proceedings at 69-75, Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. 3AN-98-
7776 CI,  3AN-98-7972 CI, and 3AN-98-8114 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 31,
1998); see also Liz Ruskin, Judge: One-Sex Marriage Issue Can Go to Voters;
Amendment Foes Plan High Court Appeal, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 1,
1998, at B1.
165. See Final Judgment, Bess (No. 3AN-98-7972 CI).
166. See Supplemental Brief of the Alaska Legislature at 1, Bess v. Ulmer, Nos.
S-8811, S-8812, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska Sept. 15, 1998).
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acting like a constitutional convention.167  The Legislature
responded that the amendment was about marriage, not
discrimination, and that it would keep Alaska’s marriage law
consistent with every other jurisdiction in the world.168
Oral argument was held on September 18, 1998.169  On Sep-
tember 22, the Alaska Supreme Court allowed the Marriage
Amendment to go forward, but deleted the second sentence.170  It
ignored Romer.171  In its opinion, the Court noted that the first sen-
tence of the amendment was simple and denied that it violated the
one subject rule.172  It also rejected the single amendment rule
sought by the Bess plaintiffs.173  The Court ruled, however, that the
second sentence was superfluous, or could provide a basis for inter-
fering with constitutional rights, and struck it down.174
The amendment was on its way to the ballot in the following
form: “To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman.”175
167. See id. at 1-4.
168. See id. at 5, 12.
169. See Liz Ruskin, Same Sex Marriage Measure Argued, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 19, 1998, at D1.
170. See Preliminary Opinion and Order, Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-
8821 (Alaska Sept. 22, 1998), aff’d, Bess v. Ulmer, 1999 WL 619092, at *13
(Alaska Aug. 17, 1999).  The Preliminary Opinion and Order was edited and in-
cluded as an appendix to the Final Opinion and Order.  See id. at *11-15 & n.3.
171. See id. at *13; Liz Ruskin, Marriage Remains on Ballot; But Court Strikes
Down Inmates’ Rights Measure, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 23, 1998, at A1.
The Final Opinion does not mention Romer either.
172. See Preliminary Opinion, 1999 WL 619092, at *13.  In contrast to the Pre-
liminary Order and Opinion, the 1999 Final Opinion and Order relegates all dis-
cussion of the deleted second sentence to a footnote.  See id. at *17 n.57.
173. See id. at *14.
174. See id. at *13.
175. S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998), as modified by Pre-
liminary Opinion and Order, 1999 WL 619092, at *14.  The Alaska Family Coali-
tion, the major citizens’ organization supporting the amendment, was critical of
the Court’s decision (and self-proclaimed authority) to delete the second sentence,
but nonetheless declared victory: “The court’s decision protects the right of Alas-
kans to determine the future of our society.  Now we can get on to the important
business of conducting a public debate on this issue that is spirited, but also civil.”
Supreme Court Rules on Legal Challenges to Ballot Measure 2, Shortened Version
of Marriage Amendment Cleared for Nov. 3 Ballot, Press Release of the Alaska
Family Coalition (Sept. 22, 1998).
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C. Popular Debate and Ratification
Early in the debate, opponents of the Marriage Amendment
claimed that the campaign would be ugly.176  As it turned out, the
campaign was spirited but not overly contentious.177
1. The Players.  The major group supporting the amendment
was the Alaska Family Coalition (the “AFC”).178  Formed in June
1998, the AFC steering committee included civic leaders,
businessmen, attorneys, a former Mayor of Anchorage, and a
former Governor’s Chief-of-Staff.179  The major group opposing the
amendment was Alaskans for Civil Rights/No On Two Campaign
(the “ACR”).180  The ACR claimed the official support of the
Alaska Democratic Party, the League of Women Voters, the
Alaska Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, and
Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays.181
2. The Arguments.  The AFC argued that the amendment
was necessary to counter the radical redefinition of marriage in
Brause.182  The ACR campaign argued that marriage was not the
issue, and that the amendment would not have any effect on
existing law (assuming defeat of the Brause plaintiffs on appeal).183
It framed the amendment as an attack on the right to privacy and
warned that its proponents might go after other groups later.184
In addition to these groups, the Catholic Bishops of Alaska is-
sued a statement favoring the definition of marriage as a relation-
176. See Steve Rinehart, Gay Marriage Haunts Campaign; Lindauer Hits
Knowles, Then Hedges on Same Sex Issue, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13,
1998, at A1.
177. See Liz Ruskin, Marriage Amendment Debate Remains Quiet,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13, 1998, at A12.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Ballot Measure #2: What Are the Facts?, Press Release (visited Feb. 5,
1999) <http://www.no-on-two.org>.
181. See id.
182. See Alaska Family Coalition Calls on ACLU to Drop Lawsuit, Press Re-
lease of the Alaska Family Coalition (Aug. 31, 1998).
183. See Ballot Measure 2 (visited Sept. 18, 1999) <http://members.tripod.com/
~no_on_2/ss1016.html>.
184. See id.  Interestingly, in order to support the argument that the amend-
ment would merely maintain the status quo, the ACR had to assume that Brause
did not change the marriage law.  Yet if the amendment disturbs privacy, which
might embolden the Legislature to change privacy protections, opponents would
have to rely upon the idea, first presented in Brause, that the right to privacy po-
tentially mandates recognition of same-sex marriage.
DUNCAN.FMT.FINAL 11/17/99  4:15 PM
242 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:2
ship between one man and one woman.185  In their statement, ad-
dressed both to Catholics and to “anyone who wished to listen,”
the Bishops expressed their conviction that “Proposition 2 is about
marriage.  In both our civic community and in our Catholic com-
munity we voters will be asked to declare ourselves on our under-
standing of marriage.  No one should miss that vote.  No one
should vote without thinking through clearly what marriage is at its
core.”186  The Bishops argued that the Marriage Amendment codi-
fies the traditional view of marriage and expresses the unique im-
portance of marriage to society.187
Polls taken during the Legislature’s debate on the Marriage
Amendment in April yielded mixed results.188  One poll claimed
that two-thirds of Alaskans supported a constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage, while another claimed only half of Alaskans fa-
vored a ban.189  As the fall progressed, both sides avoided the issue
of homosexuality.  Opponents focused on privacy and civil rights.
Supporters focused on self-government and reaffirming the mean-
ing of marriage.190
185. See My Turn: Marriage is Between One Man, One Woman (visited Sept.
18, 1999) <http://www.no-on-two.org/je0909a.html>.
186. Id.  There are 40,000 Catholics in Alaska.  See Maureen Clark, Bishops
Back Single-Sex Marriage Ban; State’s Roman Catholic Leaders Air Views in Letter
to Parishioners, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 1998, at B1.
187. See My Turn, supra note 185.
188. See Liz Ruskin, Polls Split on Gay Marriage Amendment; Question Gets
Opposite Results, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 1998, at B1.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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3. The Controversies.  The Amendment collided with the
gubernatorial campaign when Republican contender John
Lindauer accused Democratic Governor Tony Knowles of
supporting same-sex marriage.  The Governor denied the charge.191
In a debate between the candidates for Lieutenant Governor,
incumbent Democrat Fran Ulmer stated that she and the Governor
felt the amendment was unnecessary.  Her opponent, State Senator
Jerry Ward, described their position on the amendment as an
example of the administration’s distance from the average voter.192
Ward noted that both he and the Republican candidate for
Governor supported the amendment.193
The issue of outside influence also arose.  American Renewal,
headed by Gary Bauer, provided a financial contribution to the
campaign for the amendment early on.194  The opponents of the
amendment were even more concerned when in October, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints gave $500,000 to the
AFC.195
The ACR campaign, however, also raised funds effectively,
even receiving a donation from Judge Michalski’s wife.196  It also
received high-profile endorsements from the League of Women
Voters of Alaska and other prominent officials and groups.197
The Anchorage Daily News endorsed the Marriage Amend-
ment.198  Observing that “a process in which a single judge provokes
the Legislature to hurriedly amend the constitution is a poor one,”
the paper argued that “society has a right to define marriage and
defend the tradition of marriage.”199  The editorial criticized the
Brause decision as “narrow, provincial” and “without context.”200
It noted that “marriage is a unique institution for historical, cul-
191. See Rinehart, supra note 176.
192. See Lt. Governor Candidates Spar on Marriages, PFD, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 9, 1998, at D7.
193. See id.
194. See Liz Ruskin, Ballot Funding Outlined; Proposition 2 Foes Lead the
Fund-Raising, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 1998, at B1.
195. See Liz Ruskin, Same-Sex Marriage Foes Given $500,000; Mormon Gift
Infuriates Opponents, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 1998, at A1. The Coali-
tion noted that there are 24,000 members of the Church in Alaska, so the charge
of outside influence was not very strong.  See id.
196. See Ruskin, supra note 194.
197. See League of Women Voters of Alaska, Ballot Measure No. 2 Attacks,
Weakens Constitution; Compass, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1998, at H4.
198. Opinion—Ballot Measure 2; A Yes Vote—But a Complex Choice,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25, 1998, at F2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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tural and biological reasons” which “should not be altered by a
sudden flash of legal light in an Alaska courtroom.”201
4. The Results.  The amendment passed overwhelmingly on
November 3, 1998 by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two percent.
Alaskans reaffirmed their definition of marriage.202
D. Post-Passage Developments
Immediately after the passage of the amendment, the Alaska
Legislature moved for the Brause case to be dismissed as moot.203
The Legislature argued that the Marriage Amendment foreclosed
the Brause plaintiffs’ claim for a marriage license by specifying that
only opposite-sex marriages are valid or recognized in the State.204
The Legislature cited the Alaska Supreme Court’s statement in the
consolidated Ulmer cases that a specific constitutional amendment
(like the Marriage Amendment) controls other constitutional
amendments that are more general.205  Thus, the Marriage
Amendment essentially trumps any of Brause’s constitutional
claims.206  The Legislature also addressed substantive criticisms of
the amendment by arguing that the State can constitutionally dis-
tinguish between unmarried persons and married persons for pur-
poses of extending certain public benefits, and that there is no fun-
damental right of unmarried couples to receive marital benefits.207
This is because marital status is not a suspect classification and le-
gitimate state purposes are advanced by favoring marriage over
non-marital relationships.208
201. Id. At the same time, however, it also strongly endorsed the extension of
domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples.  See id.
202. See Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (copy
of Lieutenant Governor’s Certificate of Election), Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88753 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); see
also Liz Ruskin, Limit on Marriage Passes in Landslide, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 4, 1998, at A1.
203. See Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Brause’s and
Dugan’s Claims as Moot Based Upon the Ratification of the Defense of Marriage
Amendment, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562) [hereinafter Ratification Memorandum].
204. See id. at 3.
205. See id. The Court repeated this observation in its Final Opinion and Or-
der, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1999 WL 619092, at *17 n.57 (“[A] spe-
cific amendment controls other more general provisions with which it might con-
flict.”).
206. See Ratification Memorandum, supra note 203, at 4.
207. See id. at 6.
208. See id. at 8-9.
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The Brause plaintiffs challenged the Legislature’s standing to
speak to the matter.209  They also charged that the Legislature’s
unwillingness to offer marriage licenses or marital benefits to same-
sex couples was evidence that the Legislature was seeking to disfa-
vor the couples.210  The plaintiffs next advanced the theory that
while the Marriage Amendment disallowed the issuance of mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples, it did not preclude a constitu-
tional right for same-sex couples to have all of the benefits attached
to legal marriage.211  Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued, the court
should overturn the amendment based on Romer v. Evans.212
The Legislature replied that same-sex couples could petition
the legislature for the extension of domestic partner benefits, but
denied that such benefits were constitutionally mandated.213  It
claimed that the amendment does not discriminate on the basis of
“sexual orientation” because it treats all unmarried persons the
same.214  It further argued that the amendment would survive con-
stitutional scrutiny because it was supported by “legitimate rea-
sons.”215  It then distinguished the Marriage Amendment from the
amendment at issue in Romer: Whereas the problem with the
Colorado amendment was its overbreadth (it could be read to deny
homosexuals any protections of the law), the Marriage Amend-
ment was amply justified by its preservation of marriage and its
prevention of conflicts with federal and state laws.216
209. See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Brause
and Dugan’s Claims Based Upon the Ratification of the Defense of Marriage
Amendment at 1, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL
88745 (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1998).
210. See id. at 5.
211. See id. at 7.
212. See id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629 (1996).
213. See Alaska Legislature’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and Dismissing Brause’s and Dugan’s Claims Based Upon the Ratification
of the Defense of Marriage Amendment at 7, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI)
[hereinafter Legislature’s Reply].
214. See id. at 8.  The Supreme Court’s Preliminary Opinion and Order noted
that the civil rights clause of the Alaska Constitution, article I, § 3, “is not affected
[by the revised text of the Marriage Amendment], for it does not specify sexual
preference as a suspect classification.”  Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821,
1999 WL 619092, at *13 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999).
215. See Legislature’s Reply at 12, supra note 213.
216. See id. at 19.  At this point, the Alaska Attorney General weighed in with
the surprisingly brief argument that the Amendment speaks for itself and that the
Brause case should be dismissed.  See Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI).
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The Legislature then moved to have Brause consolidated with
Bess, arguing that the two cases involved the same parties (Brause,
Dugan and the Legislature) and the same issue (the constitutional-
ity of the Marriage Amendment).217  In the alternative, the Legisla-
ture requested a grant of intervenor status.  The request was based
on it being a party to the federal equal protection claims originally
brought in Bess, which charged the Legislature with unconstitu-
tional “animus” – claims that were now being repeated post-
election by the Brause plaintiffs.218  Plaintiffs curtly disagreed, and
accused the Legislature of trying to intervene just to remove Judge
Michalski from the case.219  Judge Michalski denied the motions.
Finally, on September 22, 1999, Judge Michalski dismissed the
Brause case.220
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
With the passage of the Alaska Marriage Amendment on No-
vember 3, 1998, the focus has shifted to constitutional questions.
The Brause and Bess plaintiffs have lodged privacy and equal pro-
tection challenges under both the Alaska and United States Consti-
tutions.  In this section we explain why we believe that none of
these challenges are likely to be successful.221
A. The Alaska Constitution
The Brause plaintiffs argue that although the amendment is
now part of the Alaska Constitution, it still constitutes “sex dis-
crimination.”  To address the tension between the amendment and
other clauses, they argue that the court should construe the
amendment to cover only marital status.  To effectuate the intent
217. See Memorandum in Support of the Alaska Legislature’s Motion to Con-
solidate this Action with Bess (No. 3AN-98-7776 CIV), Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562
CI).
218. See id. at 5.
219. See Response to Alaska Legislature’s Renewed Motion to Intervene at 2,
Brause (No. 3AN-95-6562 CI).
220. See Superior Court Rules on Same-Sex Marriage Lawsuit, Press Release
of Senator Loren Leman (Sept. 22, 1999) (on file with authors).  On Oct. 28, 1999,
in the wake of the dismissal of Brause, the ACLU filed a new suit against the State
of Alaska and Municipality of Anchorage, claiming that under the Alaska Consti-
tution the government may not offer marriage-based benefits without offering
equal benefits to “domestic partners.”  See ACLU Lawsuit Seeks Equal Benefits
for Alaska’s Gay and Lesbian Employees, Press Release of the Alaska Civil Liber-
ties Union (Oct. 27, 1999) (on file with authors).
221. A similar version of this analysis appears in Coolidge, supra note 3, ad-
justed to address specifics of the Hawaii text.
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of the equal protection clause, the court should therefore confer
upon plaintiffs all marital benefits and rights.222  Similar arguments
have been made in Baehr v. Anderson, the Hawaii same-sex mar-
riage case. 223
However, if the amendment clearly intends to overturn Judge
Michalski’s decision, then the logic of that decision - his privacy
and equal protection holdings - cannot survive.  Alaska’s equal pro-
tection clause should be read as it was prior to Brause, in which
case no “tension” need exist between that section and the amend-
ment that has recently joined it.  Moreover, the term marriage in
the amendment should be understood to encompass both the status
and benefits of marriage.  No artificial separation of them is justifi-
able.  Similar arguments have been made by the parties and amici
in the Hawaii case.224
We do not expect that the courts will interpret the Marriage
Amendment narrowly, and equal protection broadly, to thereby
mandate marital rights and benefits to unmarried couples.  How-
ever, the Alaska Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
“sexual orientation” should be treated as a suspect classification.
Although neither Brause nor Bess initially addressed the issue,
plaintiffs may argue that the Marriage Amendment discriminates
on the basis of  “sexual orientation” and merits heightened scru-
tiny.
Only recently, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that
“sexual orientation” constitutes a suspect classification under the
Oregon Constitution.  On this basis, it has ordered that spousal
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 17, Baehr v. Anderson,
No. 91-1394-05 (Haw. Jan. 22, 1999) (arguing that because Hawaii’s  Marriage
Amendment did not overturn the Hawaii Supreme Court’s  earlier holding in
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) that the marriage statute constituted sex
discrimination, Hawaii’s equal protection clause entitles plaintiffs to  marital rights
and benefits).  In addition, as amicus in Baehr, the ACLU of Hawaii urges the
Court to apply a “preservation principle” that would resolve any “conflict” be-
tween the amendment and the existing Hawaii equal protection clause by requir-
ing marital benefits to be granted to same-sex couples.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii Foundation, Baehr v. Miike, No.
91-1394-05 (Haw. Dec. 22, 1998).
224. See Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawaii Catholic Conference,
Baehr v. Anderson, No. 91-1394-05 (Haw. Dec. 23, 1998) (arguing that the Hawaii
Amendment overruled Baehr v. Lewin and treats marital benefits and status as
inseparable), and Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Brief, Baehr v. An-
derson, No. 91-1394-05 (Feb. 1, 1999) (arguing that the marriage law does not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex, and that the term marriage should be understood to
encompass both status and benefits).
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benefits be provided to all similarly situated “domestic partners.”225
Based on such logic, one could argue that even if marital status re-
mains a reasonable classification, the constitutional imperative of
overcoming “sexual orientation” discrimination requires the equal
distribution of all marital benefits and rights.
However, the likelihood of the Alaska Supreme Court making
a similar holding is remote.  The Oregon decision is only interme-
diate, and was not appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court.226  No
other court has followed its lead.  Attempts to establish “sexual
orientation” as a suspect classification at the federal level also con-
tinue to fail.227  Finally, Alaska has a Marriage Amendment,
whereas Oregon does not.  It would be odd, to say the least, for the
Supreme Court to hold that one section of the Constitution is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny based on another section.228
225. See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998). The Court of Appeals examined the Oregon Health Sciences Univer-
sity’s policy of using the category of “spouse” for granting insurance benefits, and
required the University to include same-sex domestic partners within this cate-
gory.  See id. at 447-48.  (The court added in a footnote that it was not addressing
the question of Oregon’s marriage statute.  See id. at 443, n.3.)  Since the term
“domestic partner” was not defined in Oregon law, the Court supplied its own
definition: “homosexual persons not related by blood closer than first cousins who
are not legally married, who have continuously lived together in an exclusive and
loving relationship that they intend to maintain for the rest of their lives, who have
joint financial accounts and joint financial responsibilities, who would be married
to each other if Oregon law permitted it, who have no other domestic partners,
and who are 18 years of age or older.”  Id. at 439.
226. A petition for a writ of mandamus, filed by an Oregon legislator, which
would have compelled the State to appeal, was denied by the Oregon Supreme
Court in March 1999.  State ex. rel. Sunseri v. Court of Appeals, No. S46055 (Or.
Mar. 15, 1999).
227. See infra note 265 (noting Circuit Courts of Appeal that have rejected
such claims).
228. The Alaska Supreme Court’s initial decision in Bess noted that the civil
rights clause of the Alaska Constitution, art. I, § 3, “is not affected [by the revised
text of the Marriage Amendment], for it does not specify sexual preference as a
suspect classification.”  Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821, 1999 WL
619092 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999).  This suggests that in the absence of added textual
authority, the Court is unlikely to hold that “sexual preference” (as it puts it) is a
suspect classification.
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B. The United States Constitution
The plaintiffs have also asserted violations of federal constitu-
tional rights.  These claims were advanced unsuccessfully before
the election, and have since been renewed.229
1. Due Process.  A substantive due process claim arises when
an individual has a “fundamental right” that has been violated by
state or federal law.  A court must first decide whether the claimed
right exists.  If not, the law will be presumed rational and upheld.
If the right exists, the court must decide if it has been violated.  If it
has, the court will apply strict scrutiny, and uphold the offending
law only if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.230
Defining a “fundamental right” and then deciding whether it
has been violated are the most crucial and yet controversial steps in
this analysis.  The Supreme Court has affirmed the right to an abor-
tion,231 and the right to marry a member of the opposite sex.232  Yet
it has rejected a right to same-sex sexual relationships233 and, most
recently, a right to assisted suicide.234
The Brause plaintiffs allege that the Marriage Amendment
deprives them of fundamental rights.  The rights of which the plain-
tiffs claim they were deprived include the right to intimate associa-
tion, privacy, and the right to marry.  The claimed right to intimate
association, however, does not exist.235  The right to privacy claim is
more familiar.  Yet, in the facts of the present case, it entangles the
plaintiffs in the same kinds of difficulties encountered by Judge
Michalski in trying to explain his decision in Brause.236  A claim that
one’s right to privacy has been violated is usually a claim of gov-
ernmental interference with one’s private behavior.  Yet, as we
229. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708, 720-21 (1997) (reaf-
firming importance of history, tradition, and specificity in identification of funda-
mental rights, to avoid policy-making by the judiciary).
231. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
232. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
233. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
234. See Washington, 521 U.S. at 702.
235. The most significant recent attempt to establish “intimate association” as a
fundamental right failed.  See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995)
(plaintiff has constitutional right to intimate association; remanded for trial under
strict scrutiny standard), vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, Shahar v.
Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 693
(1998).
236. For a discussion of Brause, see supra Part II.B.
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have seen, marriage is not a “private behavior.”  It is a public status
to which rights and benefits attach.
The right to marry claim seems most appropriate.  The Mar-
riage Amendment forbids plaintiffs from marrying.  Plaintiffs must
convince the court that they can marry, and that same-sex marriage
will merely extend, rather than redefine, Western traditions of
marriage.237
The possibility that the United States Supreme Court will
agree with the plaintiffs is very remote.  First, although the Court
has not yet addressed this issue, other courts have, and except for
237. The Supreme Court has become more cautious in recent years about rec-
ognizing rights “by extension.”  Consider these remarks by Justice Rehnquist from
his majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), rev’g
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996 (en banc)):
[T]he Court’s opinion in Casey described, in general ways and in light of
our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this court has
identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so funda-
mental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  That many of the rights
and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all im-
portant, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey did
not suggest otherwise.
Id. at 727-28 (footnotes and citations omitted).  Glucksberg thus expressly limits
the scope of the so-called “mystery passage” in Casey, which was the initial occa-
sion for the “right-to-die” cases: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
man life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).  District Judge Barbara Roth-
stein relied explicitly on the “mystery passage” to justify her initial ruling in Com-
passion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-65 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
which was affirmed by Judge Reinhardt in the en banc opinion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1996).  The Supreme Court, however, obviously
came to a much different conclusion.  Glucksberg suggests that it will be difficult
to establish new fundamental rights.  For readings sympathetic to this conclusion,
see Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 666, and Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage —
Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253, 262-272 (1998).
For dissenting perspectives on Glucksberg, see, e.g., John P. Safranek, M.D. &
Stephen J. Safranek, Can the Right to Autonomy be Resuscitated After Glucks-
berg?, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 731 (1998); Kathryn L. Tucker, Symposium, The
Death with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options after
Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 923 (1998).
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Brause, now overruled, none have accepted same-sex couple’s fun-
damental right to marry.238
Second, despite arguments made by plaintiffs and their allies,
there exists no line of Supreme Court cases concerning the right to
marry that, if only logically extended, lead inexorably to same-sex
marriage.239
238. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55-57 (Haw. 1993) (unanimity on this issue,
despite differences on equal protection); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 331 (1995) (same);  Baker v. State, No. S1009-97, (Vt. Super. Ct. Dec. 17,
1997), appeal pending,  No. 98-32 (Vt 1999).
239. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down a Missouri regula-
tion forbidding certain prisoners from marrying); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin law forbidding remarriage unless child sup-
port payments are current, on fundamental rights/equal protection grounds);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation
laws partly on  due process grounds).  For a thorough review of these and other
Supreme Court decisions, see Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Consti-
tutional Right to Marry, 1790-1990, 41 HOWARD L.J. 289, 302-34 (1998).  In
Wardle’s view,
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected right to marry and has consistently indicated that the legislature
has the primary role in defining and regulating marriage.  The Court,
however, has also recently expressed (but rarely exercised) its authority
to strike down exorbitant laws that infringe extremely the traditional
right to marry.
Id. at 336; see also Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims
For Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (arguing that the Court defines mar-
riage as a male-female community).  For alternative views, see, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 123-152 (1996); MARK
STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 49-74
(1997).  Strasser argues that same-sex marriage should not be characterized as a
new right, but as an extension of an already-guaranteed right.  He argues for a
broad reading of due process based on Casey.  See id at 51-52, 64, 67-70.  Strasser’s
reading of Casey, however, antedates the narrower reading of due process offered
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Glucksberg.
Eskridge argues that Zablocki and Turner, properly understood, mandate the
legalization of same-sex marriage.  Claiming that marriage is “a prepolitical form
of interpersonal liberty,” Eskridge attempts to use Zablocki to claim that there are
only two legitimate elements of a due process test: (1) “Is there a ‘direct legal ob-
stacle in the path of persons desiring to get married?,’” and (2) “[i]f so, is that re-
striction ‘supported by sufficiently important state interests and . . . closely tai-
lored to effectuate only those interests?’”  ESKRIDGE, supra, at 131-32.  In his
opinion, “[t]he real problem with the Hawaii decision [which rejected the idea of a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage] is its addition of an unauthorized third
step: Is the couple one that has traditionally been allowed to marry?”  Id.  Ac-
cording to Eskridge’s version of due process analysis, tradition is irrelevant:
“[T]he plaintiffs need not show their historical pedigree; all they have to show is
their exclusion from a state-created fundamental right.”  Id. at 133.  Evidently
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Third, ironically, the conflict over same-sex marriage may
have strengthened the historic and existing public consensus that
marriage, properly understood, requires a man and a woman.
Given this public reaffirmation, and faced with the alternative of
(explicitly or implicitly) striking down marriage statutes in all fifty
states, the Court is unlikely to strike down the Marriage Amend-
ment.240  The Court would more likely uphold the Marriage
Amendment as a legitimate exercise of self-government and might
even reaffirm the existing definition of marriage itself.
2. Equal Protection.  An equal protection attack on the
Marriage Amendment would assert that a state or federal law
makes classifications based on a biased category that adversely
affects a group of citizens.  Confronted with such a claim, a court
would have to decide whether a law classifies on the basis claimed.
If the law does classify on the basis claimed, a court would have to
decide on the appropriate standard of review, then determine
whether, despite using the biased category, the law should survive.
Laws that bear “a rational relation to some legitimate end” are
usually upheld.241  However, laws that classify on the basis of a
category such as race, sex, ancestry, or illegitimacy are subject to
heightened scrutiny.  This heightened scrutiny is strict or interme-
diate, depending upon the classification.  In either case, the burden
of proof shifts from the plaintiffs to the State - requiring the State
to show how the law meets the heightened standard.242
Equal protection attacks on the Alaska Marriage Amendment
would most likely be of two kinds: (1) that the Amendment dis-
criminates based on sex, and should receive intermediate scrutiny,
or (2) that the Amendment is based on “animus” toward gays,
Eskridge believes the Court should have this power because “[m]arriage is an im-
portant social and legal construction, and it is what we make it to be.”  Id. at 160.
240. There is nothing in text, tradition, history or experience to suggest that
marriage can be reasonably extended to same-sex couples unless its meaning is
radically altered.  The only way to accomplish this extension is to first redefine
marriage as merely a form of “relational privacy” or “prepolitical liberty,” as Pro-
fessor Eskridge has attempted, and then persuade the Court to enact it.  See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 239, at 131-34.  If Professor McConnell is right that the
Court has adopted “a constitutional jurisprudence of unenumerated rights under
the Due Process Clause based not on the normative judgments of courts, but on
constitutional text supplemented by the tradition and experience of the nation,”
such an outcome is highly unlikely.  Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 666.
241. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
242. See id. at 632.
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which fails even the rational basis test.  Here we examine both
claims, concluding that each should be rejected.
a. Is the Amendment “Sex-Discrimination”?  Laws that
classify “based on sex” are treated by the Supreme Court as “quasi-
suspect” classifications requiring “intermediate” or “skeptical”
scrutiny.243  United States v. Virginia provides a two-part test for
conducting this scrutiny.244  First, a statute must be identified as
“sex-based.”245  Second, “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive’
justification for that action.”246  To be “exceedingly persuasive,”
according to Justice Ginsburg, means the following:
The State must show “at least that the [challenged] classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the discrimi-
natory means employed” are “substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”  The justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation.  And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females.247
The Justice adds, “[t]he heightened review standard our precedent
establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification.”248  She
observes that, unlike distinctions based on race or national origin,
“[p]hysical differences between men and women, however, are en-
during: ‘[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of
both.’”249  She continues: “‘Inherent differences’ between men and
women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration,
but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial
constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”250
It is clear from Justice Ginsburg’s logic that a statute that dis-
advantages one sex over the other is a sex-based classification that
243. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
244. See id. at 530-31.
245. Id.
246. Id.  The Court declined to adopt a strict scrutiny test, although it could be
argued that it toughened the intermediate scrutiny standard.  See Anita Blair,
How We Got the ERA, THE WOMEN’S QUARTERLY 6-10 (Spring 1997).
247. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (internal citations and italics omitted).
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
250. Id.
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merits “skeptical scrutiny.”251  It is not clear that Justice Ginsburg
would see the Marriage Amendment as such a law.252
Since the Supreme Court has yet to address this question, we
can only look at other courts for guidance.  Only the Hawaii Su-
preme Court and one Alaska trial court have held that a marriage
statute represents a sex-based classification that deserves height-
ened scrutiny.253  By defining the object of analysis as couples rather
than individuals, these courts held the statutes to be sex discrimina-
tion.  Both decisions have been overruled by amendments ap-
proved by their respective electorates.254  One other high court (the
District of Columbia)255 and one appellate court (Washington)256
have held that a marriage statute does not classify based on sex.
By defining the object of analysis as individuals rather than cou-
ples, these courts held that the statutes were based on the defini-
tion of marriage.  Since women and men have the equal right to
marry, the courts found no evidence of sex discrimination.  Thus,
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.
251. Professor Cass Sunstein characterizes Ginsburg’s argument in this way:
“The problem with the Virginia system was not that the state noticed a difference
between men and women, but that it turned that difference into a disadvantage.”
Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1996).  Sunstein adds that:
The Court emphasized that there are indeed biological and social differ-
ences between men and women, and that these differences are to be
“celebrat[ed],” not turned into a source of inequality.  The opinion sug-
gests that the problem of gender inequality is a problem of second-class
citizenship, in which the state uses women’s differences from men as a
justification for prescribing gender roles in a way that deprives women of
equal opportunity.  Significantly, this conception of gender equality
avoids a claim that women are not biologically or socially different from
men.  It also avoids a claim that those differences justify unequal treat-
ment.
Id. at 76-77.
252. If it does so, the Court may find itself in uncharted waters where it would
rather “leave things undecided.”  See Sunstein, supra note 251, at 72-78 (com-
mending the “minimalism” of Virginia.).
253. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (requiring strict scrutiny
under the Hawaii Constitution); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-
6562, 1998 WL 88743, at *5 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1997) (requiring intermediate scru-
tiny under the Alaska Constitution).
254. By our reading, the Hawaii Marriage Amendment overturns Baehr, and
the Alaska Marriage Amendment overturns Brause.  On Hawaii, see Coolidge,
supra note 3.
255. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 310-31 (D.C. App. 1995).
In his dissent in Dean, Judge Ferren, who was sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims,
based his argument on sexual orientation, rather than gender.  See id.
256. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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Is it likely that the Supreme Court will follow the Hawaii Su-
preme Court and hold that the Marriage Amendment is a form of
sex discrimination?  We think not.  The amendment does not clas-
sify based on “physical differences” or “inherent differences” be-
tween men and women.257  Instead, the Marriage Amendment is
based upon what Justice Ginsberg calls “a community composed of
both [sexes].”258  The Justice rightly states that “the two sexes are
not fungible.”259  Marriage law, which is based upon this truth, is a
unique legal category.  In marriage, neither sex is disadvantaged;
both are equally included.  Marriage does not separate the sexes,
but instead unites them.260
As a matter of prudence, the Court should hesitate before
casting a cloud upon marriage law in all fifty states, if not over-
turning them outright.  Such a decision would pre-empt the politi-
cal process, similar to the effect of Roe v. Wade,261 in an area that
has always been considered primarily a matter of decision-making
for the States.262  Moreover, the Court should anticipate that if it
strikes down the Marriage Amendment, it might generate a na-
tional movement for a federal marriage amendment.  By so doing,
it may plunge the country into strife over marriage and damage its
own credibility as a reliable interpreter of the Constitution.
257. For example, because only women can become pregnant, a law that classi-
fied based on pregnancy would be a genuine “sex-based classification,” presuma-
bly subject to intermediate scrutiny.  However, such a law would not be based on
prejudicial notions, and might thereby survive Justice Ginsburg’s test.  For an
analogous discussion in a statutory context, see California Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (explaining that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act is consistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because it
is carefully drawn to avoid “archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and
the abilities of pregnant workers”).
258. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
259. Id.
260. Professor Wardle argues that existing marriage statutes, which require one
person of each sex for a legal marriage, convey a critical message about the equal
contribution of both sexes to an important social institution.  Legalizing same-sex
marriage, on the other hand, would send a message that a woman is not necessary
and equally indispensable to the socially valued institution of marriage, thereby
weakening rather than strengthening equality for the vast majority of women.  See
Wardle, supra note 95, at 87.
261. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
262. For doubts about the wisdom of proceeding in this direction, see Sunstein,
supra note 251, at 96-99 (recommending that the Court allow the marriage issue to
be resolved legislatively rather than intervening and pre-empting the democratic
process); see also Richard Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage?  And
If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1585-86 (1997).
DUNCAN.FMT.FINAL 11/17/99  4:15 PM
256 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:2
b. Romer v. Evans and the Marriage Amendment.  Apart
from whether or not the Marriage Amendment is a “sex-based
classification,” does it fail even rational basis review because it
“targets” gays and lesbians based on “animus”?
Before 1996, rational basis review was fairly straightforward:
laws bearing a rational  relation to a legitimate governmental end
were upheld.  Yet in Romer v. Evans,263 the Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment (“Amendment 2”) which clas-
sified on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
tion.”264  The question, therefore, is squarely posed: is Romer a po-
tential basis for overturning the Marriage Amendment?  The
Brause and Bess plaintiffs claim that it is.265
263. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
264. Romer invalidated “Amendment 2,” which was put on the ballot by initia-
tive.  It reads, in pertinent part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, or-
dinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any mi-
nority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimina-
tion.  This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.
Id. at 624.
265. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent
Injunction at 7, Bess v. Ulmer, No. 3AN-98-7776 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 17,
1998). The challengers may also argue that sexual orientation should merit height-
ened scrutiny analogous to gender or race.  This is the approach of the Oregon
Tanner case, supra note 225.  But see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52 n.11 (The Baehr plu-
rality did not hold that the marriage statute discriminates based on “sexual orien-
tation.”).  Although two federal district courts did reach this conclusion, both ver-
dicts were subsequently reversed.  See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850,
861-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998);
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
436 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).  Meanwhile, nine other
Circuit decisions have rejected the claim, and none have accepted it.  See
Equalality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 927-928 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97
F.3d 256, 268 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3254 (1997); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1990);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied,
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The Court struck down Amendment 2 because, by its reading,
Amendment 2 was “at once too narrow and too broad.”266  It was
too narrow because it characterized a class of people by a single
trait.267  It was too broad because, on the basis of that single trait, it
“then denie[d] them protection across the board.”268  Based on this
combination of targeting plus potentially limitless breadth, the
Court concluded that Amendment 2 could not possibly be justified
by the State’s alleged reasons (i.e., conserving resources and asso-
ciational privacy).269  Rather, Amendment 2 was “inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects.”270  The major-
ity opinion considered Amendment 2 not only irrational, but evil.271
Romer is the subject of wide and contradictory commentary.272
We observe three views of how it might apply to the issue of the
constitutionality of the Marriage Amendment.  The first view ar-
gues that Romer is an insufficient basis for overturning the Mar-
riage Amendment.  The second argues that Romer can and should
be used to overturn the Marriage Amendment.  The third argues
that Romer could be used to overturn the Amendment, but coun-
sels against doing so.
The first view, represented by Professor Richard Duncan of
Nebraska, is that Romer has nothing to do with marriage laws
478 U.S. 1035 (1986); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270,
1273 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
266. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
267. See id.  As the Court sees it, the Amendment “imposes a special disability
upon those persons alone.”  Id. at 631.
268. Id. The Court interpreted Amendment 2 not merely as repealing ordi-
nances passed by municipalities prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, but also as prohibiting “all legislative, executive or judicial action at
any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class, a class
we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”  Id. at 624.  For this
reason, the Court dismissed the claim that the statutes repealed by Amendment 2
concerned “special rights.”  In the Court’s words, “[w]e find nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 withholds.  These are protections taken for granted by
most people either because they already have them or do not need them; these are
protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.”  Id. at 631.
269. See id. at 635.
270. Id. at 632.
271. This is the characterization of the majority’s opinion by the dissent.  See id.
at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. The literature is voluminous.  Besides the work of Duncan, Sunstein, and
Koppelman, which we discuss in this section, one can consult the full list of articles
in Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and The Limits of Legitimacy: Stripping Oppo-
nents of Gay and Lesbian Rights of Their “First Line of Defense” in the Same-sex
Marriage Fight, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 219 n.10 (1998).
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amendments.  Romer is not a case about sexual orientation per se.
Instead, it is about the irrationality of laws that broadly disable any
narrowly targeted group.273
According to Duncan, marriage statutes define marriage,
rather than disadvantage homosexuals.274  In Duncan’s view, these
statutes should easily pass rational basis review because they ra-
tionally advance at least these legitimate purposes: (1) encouraging
public morality, (2) encouraging childbirth within marriage, (3) en-
273. Duncan argues that Romer has a “narrow and shallow bite”: “It is narrow
in the sense that the Court decided only the case before it and avoided creating
broad rules that courts might apply in other cases.  The decision is shallow in the
sense that the Court’s reasoning was almost subrational - there is more reflex than
reason in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer.”  Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow
and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage:
A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147,
148 (1997) [hereinafter Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite]; see also Richard
F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme Court Storytelling, The Cul-
ture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 346-55 (1996) (ar-
guing that the Court in Romer applied ordinary equal protection analysis and cre-
ated no new standards generally applicable to gay rights cases).  In Duncan’s
opinion, the case would have come out the same way had the Colorado Amend-
ment been targeted at any “narrowly defined” group.  See Duncan, The Narrow
and Shallow Bite, supra, at 149 (citing Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and
Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 94 (1997)).  The Court, Duncan
believes, seemed more concerned about suspect laws than suspect classifications.
See id.  Furthermore, according to Duncan, “[i]t was the extreme overbreadth of
Amendment 2 — not the identity of the class of persons covered by the Amend-
ment that concerned . . . the majority.”  Id. at 150.  He considers the fact that Ro-
mer left Bowers v. Hardwick standing, and did not hold that “sexual orientation”
is a suspect classification, to confirm this interpretation.  See id. at 150-52 (refer-
ring to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).  Duncan notes that the respon-
dents in Romer did not ask the Supreme Court to overrule Hardwick.  See id. at
154.  From this he concludes that Romer “did not hold that moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct is invidious or irrational.”  Id. at 150.  One may infer the
presence of animus when a law (1) narrowly targets a specific group, (2) imputes a
broad and undifferentiated disability to this group, and (3) the State offers no ra-
tional purpose.  One need not search the public record for general “evidence” of
animus.  One need only look at the law and the reasons offered for it, and infer
“animus” if these first two criteria are not met.
274. [T]hose who wish to use Romer and the rational basis test to overturn
conventional marriage laws are tilting at windmills.  Laws defining mar-
riage as a relationship between one man and one woman do not target a
class of persons and deny that class the opportunity to protect itself po-
litically against a limitless number of discriminatory harms and exclu-
sions.  Marriage laws define and regulate the institution of marriage, but
they do not forbid any individual or group from seeking the law’s protec-
tion against any kind of public or private discrimination.
Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite, supra note 273, at 157-58.
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couraging dual-gender parenting, (4) educating children, and (5)
avoiding slippery slope marital redefinitions.275  A Marriage
Amendment, such as the one in Hawaii, is a valid exercise of
democratic self-government.  Alaska’s amendment is no less valid
for including in its text a definition of marriage as the union of a
man and a woman. 276
The second view, represented by Professor Andrew Koppel-
man of Northwestern, is virtually the opposite of Duncan’s view.
Koppelman reads Romer as a judicial breakthrough whose logic
should lead to the overturning of any Marriage Amendment such
as Alaska’s.277
Koppelman agrees with Duncan that the rule in Romer has no
particular connection to questions of “sexual orientation.”278  But
he disagrees that this rule constitutes Romer’s full significance.  In
addition, Koppelman argues, the political context of hostility to-
ward gays must also be considered in analyzing Romer.279  Further-
275. See id. at 147, 158-65.  He adds, “If the Court is ever so foolish as to de-
clare the dual-gender definition of marriage unconstitutional, it will need much
more than Romer to explain this sad conclusion.”  Id. at 165-66.
276. See id. at 158; Richard F. Duncan, They Call Me “Eight Eyes”: Hardwick’s
Respectability, Romer’s Narrowness, and Same-Sex Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 241, 247-48 (1998).  Duncan’s words about the Hawaii Amendment there-
fore apply with equal force to Alaska: “[t]he amendment is clearly related to the
eminently legitimate goal of protecting the collective right of democratic self-
government.”  Id. at 248.  But see MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROSPECTS 54-65
(1999) (arguing that the Alaska Marriage Amendment is based on animus and
should be invalidated).
277. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 89 (1997).
278. If a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it
disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discerni-
ble relationship to any legitimate governmental interest, then the Court
will infer that the law’s purpose is simply to harm that group, and so will
invalidate the law.
Id. at 94.  Duncan indicates his agreement with this formulation.  See Duncan, The
Narrow and Shallow Bite, supra note 273, at 148.
279. “[T]he issue,” Koppelman maintains, “is what the purpose of the law is in
the context in which it was enacted.  This question ‘has meaning and can find an
answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge about the facts of
life in the times and places aforesaid.’  To say it again, context matters.”  Koppel-
man, supra note 277, at 122 (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960)); see also id. at 93 (arguing
that the Romer decision implicitly recognizes a widespread animus toward gays
that undermines the credibility of any attempt to justify laws that single out homo-
sexuals); id. at 123-26 (discussing discrimination against and stereotyping of gays
as a pervasive issue in American society, and arguing that an understanding of this
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more, Romer means that from now on, when the Court is con-
fronted with a law that discriminates based on “sexual orientation,”
it will look more carefully for evidence of an impermissible pur-
pose behind such a law.280  Therefore, though Romer does not ac-
cord “sexual orientation” heightened scrutiny as such, and does not
overrule Hardwick, it opens the door for both possibilities in the
future.281
According to Koppelman, Romer offers a three-part test that
can be applied to marriage statutes and marriage amendments:282
(1) Does a marriage law impose disabilities upon a narrowly de-
fined group of people?  (2) Are gays, lesbians and bisexuals the
targeted group?  If the answers to (1) and (2) are both yes, then the
Court should cease deference, and ask itself (3) whether the back-
ground cultural and legal context discloses evidence of invidious
intent.283
background is vital in understanding why Amendment 2 was found unconstitu-
tional).
280. See id. at 89-90.  According to Koppelman, when the Court looks for an
impermissible purpose, it is likely to find it: “Laws that discriminate against gays
will always be constitutionally doubtful, however, because they will always arouse
suspicion that they rest on a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.
Thus teaches Romer v. Evans.”  Id. (citation omitted).
281. See id. at 137-38.  Indeed, Koppelman quotes from Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (indicating
that proof of a discriminatory purpose as a motivating factor in legislation elimi-
nates the justification for judicial deference) and then explicitly reasons why sex-
ual orientation should be a suspect classification: “A classification should be sus-
pect, then, if many citizens think that the classification in question distinguishes
persons who are entitled to a full measure of concern and respect from persons
who are inherently degraded and inferior.  Sexual orientation is a classification of
this sort.”  Id. at 134.
282. See supra notes 278-281 and accompanying text.
283. Question (3) is the most crucial, yet it turns out to be rather slippery.
“The fact that a group, narrowly defined, is saddled with a broad range of disabili-
ties,” Koppelman acknowledges, “does not, without more, warrant an inference of
impermissible motive.”  Koppelman, supra note 273, at 122.  What, then, warrants
such an inference?  Koppelman offers these “indicia” from the example of
Amendment 2:
(a) The Text.  The “targeting” was relatively straightforward, because the text
itself referred not to “sexual orientation” generally, but to “homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”  Id. at 93 & n.19.  For
this reason the arguments provided by the State to justify the law are, in the final
analysis, irrelevant.  The Court “strikes down some laws, even those that can be
given innocent explanations, when objective indicia of invidious intent dispose the
Court toward suspicion.”  Id. at 121.  Indeed, the least possible trace of an “im-
permissible motive” unmasks the innocence and provides an objective indicator.
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In Koppelman’s opinion, there is no legitimate basis for the le-
gal distinction between male-female and same-sex couples.  The
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is a reflection of pa-
triarchy and homophobia.284  Koppelman’s answer to the first ques-
tion, therefore, is succinct: By limiting marriage to male-female
Thus the explicit reasons offered by the State “cannot resolve the constitutional
debate over that issue.”  Id. at 146 n.164.
(b) The Context.  In the absence of concrete evidence, Koppelman must find
an “inadmissible purpose” by a series of inferences: (1) marriage laws deny bene-
fits to all except male-female couples; therefore (2) this denial is especially tar-
geted at gays, lesbians and bisexuals; therefore (3) the “objective indicia” of this
“impermissible purpose” is some combination of text, cultural background and
legislative history.  Koppelman also argues that “[v]iewing Amendment 2 as sex
discrimination would have been a simpler and more automatic path to heightened
scrutiny.”  Id. at 130.  He believes that this view — equating sexual orientation
discrimination with sex discrimination — is plausible because “[a]ny action that
singles out homosexuals facially classifies on the basis of sex.”  Id. at 129.  Kop-
pelman assumes that it is a matter of common knowledge that heterosexism and
sexism are linked.  See id.  He expands on this point in another article: “[T]he ef-
fect that the taboo against homosexuality has in modern American society is, in
large part, the maintenance of illegitimate hierarchy; the taboo accomplishes this
by reinforcing the identity of the superior caste in the hierarchy, and this effect is
at least in large part the reason why the taboo persists.”  Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 255 (1994) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Koppelman, Sex
Discrimination].
Koppelman argues that evidence of invidious intent toward gays, lesbians and
bisexuals is so plain from the common knowledge of our culture that if the Su-
preme Court understands what is really happening, it will clearly see that
Amendment 2 was based on an impermissible purpose.  See Koppelman, supra
note 277, at 123.  However, when it comes to the actual context of Amendment 2,
he concedes that “[t]he evidence of actual discriminatory animus is sparse.  The
offending, overbroad language of the Amendment did not even appear on the
ballot, which contained only a summary of the law.  Survey data does not turn up
convincing evidence of impermissible animus in the Colorado electorate.”  Id. at
135.  Despite this admission, Koppelman argues that Amendment 2 is like the
anti-miscegenation law overruled in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967):
In both Loving and Romer, the kind of classification that was used trig-
gered a presumption of unconstitutionality, which the state was unable to
overcome.  In both cases, the triggering of that presumption was appro-
priate because the classifications in question were ones that were widely
understood to separate those citizens who were fully human from the
untermenschen.  The use of such classifications sufficed to raise a serious
doubt about the legitimacy of the laws’ motivations.  Once such a doubt
has been raised, legislation can no longer be presumed to be constitu-
tional.
Id. at 133.
284. See generally Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 283, at 238.
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couples, marriage laws facially target a “narrowly defined class.”
Second, lesbians, gays and bisexuals are that targeted class.  Third,
if one looks at the cultural background of hatred, stereotyping,
sexism and religious belief against gays and lesbians, polls that
show widespread popular opposition to legalizing same-sex “mar-
riage,” and alleged examples of “animus” that have surfaced during
the 1998 campaign, one has a clear basis for inferring “invidious in-
tent” behind marriage laws.  Says Koppelman, “I have been argu-
ing for years that the Constitution requires recognition of same-sex
marriage.”285
The third view, represented by Professor Cass Sunstein of
Chicago, is that there is a  relationship between Romer and the
Marriage Amendment, but it is one fraught with danger.  Sunstein
offers his proposed interpretation:286
The underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legiti-
mate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply be-
cause the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosex-
ual behavior.  The state must justify discrimination on some
other, public-regarding ground.287
In Sunstein’s view, Romer “embodies a ban on laws motivated by a
desire to create second-class citizenship, a point that connects the
outcome with United States v. Virginia as well.  This was the for-
bidden motivation that the Court described as ‘animus.’”288  Romer
sends a message to counter that animus: gays, lesbians and bisexu-
als are citizens like everybody else.289
285. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Pol-
icy, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 921, 932 & n.30 (1998) [hereinafter Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage] (citing previous articles) (citation omitted).  He also believes the De-
fense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional.  See Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA:
Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1(1997).
Professor Mark Strasser has similar sentiments: “That Congress would even con-
sider passing such an act and that the president would even consider signing such a
bill into law are testaments to the willingness of many to codify the stigmatization
of a disfavored group in exchange for votes.”  STRASSER, supra note 239, at 127.
“It is difficult,” he adds, “to imagine what explanation could be offered for
DOMA other than that of animus.”  Id. at 139.
286. See Sunstein, supra note 251, at 64.  On the surface, it is “narrow and
shallow,” yet it “may turn out to be broader and deeper,” because “ultimately
analogical reasoning and principles of stare decisis will determine its scope.”  Id.
In short, “Romer imposes unusually few constraints on its own interpretation.”  Id.
287. Id. at 62.
288. Id. at 63 (internal citation omitted).
289. “At least in the short run,” Sunstein argues,
[T]he importance of Romer v. Evans may lie more in its expressive func-
tion than in its concrete effects on law and policy.  It says something
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Although Sunstein sees a link between “animus” and “sexual
orientation” in his reading of Romer, he has not endorsed the judi-
cial invalidation of marriage statutes.290  Regarding the issue of
same-sex “marriage,” he argues that “the Court should eschew
broad rules and proceed in a way that complements and does not
displace democratic processes.”291  Sunstein is silent, however, on
the question of whether he agrees with the substantive arguments
for using Romer to overrule marriage statutes.  Instead, he appeals
to “minimalism,” prudence, incrementalism, democratic delibera-
tion and attention to possible adverse consequences of judicial ac-
tivism.292
Because Sunstein is as concerned about the process by which
same-sex marriage may be legalized, as he is about the substance of
the issue, we think that his type of analysis would uphold the Mar-
riage Amendment.  Unlike Amendment 2, the Marriage Amend-
ment went through the normal legislative process.293  It is not an at-
tack on homosexuals.  Instead, it only resolves the question of how
marriage is defined under Alaska law.294  Judge Michalski declared
that the marriage statute required strict scrutiny.  The people of
Alaska decided otherwise.  Alaskans are the authors of their Con-
stitution, and ultimately it is their issue to resolve.  Professor Sun-
stein would likely consider it reckless for either the Alaska or the
United States Supreme Court to overturn the Marriage Amend-
ment on the ground that it is based on “animus.”
large about the place of homosexuals in society.  Whatever the doctrinal
complexities, it claims, and is understood to claim, that they are citizens
like everyone else.
Id. at 71 (internal citation omitted).
290. Id. at 98-99.
291. Id. at 100.  See also Posner, supra note 262, at 1585-86, for similar argu-
ments in favor of judicial restraint.
292.
Even if judges find the challenge to the ban on same-sex marriages plau-
sible in substance, there is much reason for caution on their part.  Imme-
diate judicial invalidation [sic] of same-sex marriages could well jeopard-
ize important interests.  It could galvanize opposition and (predictably)
lead to a strong movement for a constitutional amendment overturning
the Court’s decision.  It could weaken the antidiscrimination movement
itself as that movement is operating in democratic arenas.  It could pro-
voke increased hostility and even violence against homosexuals.  It would
certainly jeopardize the authority of the judiciary.
Sunstein, supra note 251, at 97 (citations omitted).
293. See supra Part III.
294. See id.
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What are we to make of these three readings of Romer, and
their implications for the question of the constitutionality of the
Alaska Marriage Amendment?  From a practical standpoint, Pro-
fessor Louis Michael Seidman of Georgetown has probably said it
best: “For now, the only thing that is certain is that the opinion is
open to a broad construction if future courts are disposed to so
construe it.  Whether they will be so disposed depends upon future
political and social developments that we cannot reliably pre-
dict.”295
What we can look at, however, are the particular “political and
social developments” that have already transpired in Alaska, in or-
der to see how persuasive these readings might be.  When we look
at the origins and passage of the Marriage Amendment, we see
these crucial facts:
The Amendment arose in immediate response to an un-
precedented court decision.296
The Amendment was the subject of public testimony
from all perspectives.297
The Amendment text is a positive statement about mar-
riage, not a negative attack.298
The Amendment sponsors and supporters did not engage
in attacks on homosexuals.299
Major media editorialized in favor of putting the Mar-
riage Amendment to a vote.300
Religious groups and religiously committed citizens ar-
gued both sides of the issue.301
295. Louis Michael Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of
Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 98.  Under Koppelman’s approach
to Romer, courts would hold that any policy, regulation, statute or constitutional
provision that defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman violates the
“meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is
hard to imagine the Supreme Court holding this, and Koppelman admits it:
[C]ourts are likely to continue to hold that homosexual sexual conduct is
not protected by the constitutional right to privacy, and that laws dis-
criminating against lesbians and gay men are not presumptively unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . .  [I]t would be surprising if the federal courts were to impose
same-sex marriage on the entire country, and the strength of the constitu-
tional arguments for doing so does not change that fact.
 Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 285, at 931-32.
296. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part III.C.
298. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part III.
300. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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The primary supporters of the Amendment did not run a
“gay-bashing” campaign targeted against lesbians, gays
and bisexuals, but instead engaged in a spirited public
debate with their opponents about the role of the courts
and the meaning of marriage.302
This does not sound like the kind of “stereotyping” and “bigotry”
that was attacked in Romer.  Instead, it looks like the majority of
Alaskans disagreed with Judge Michalski about marriage.
C. The Real Question
We believe that the constitutionality of the Alaska Marriage
Amendment boils down to a surprisingly simple question: May the
People of a State correct a misinterpretation of their Constitution by
their courts?  It is hard to think of any answer but the most obvious
one: Yes, they may.  How can it be unconstitutional for the people
to act as authors of their Constitution?
The only real case that can be made against the constitution-
ality of the Marriage Amendment is what one might call the “good
guys/bad guys” argument.303  In this reading, there are two sides.
The “good guys” are the gay and lesbian community of Alaska, and
their allies.  The court is the defender of the victims.  The “bad
guys” are the majority of ordinary citizens of Alaska, who are de-
picted as either bigots or the tools of bigots.  The Legislature is
nothing more than a set of “politicians” who are accessories to the
crime.  In this script, the forces of good seek to defend the Alaska
Constitution against the forces of evil who would “limit” (i.e.,
amend) it.
301. See supra Part III.C.
302. See id.
303. For examples of this Manichean strategy, written by those with consider-
able experience in telling such tales, see Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v.
Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343 (1997); Symposium, Constructing Family, Con-
structing Change: Shifting Legal Perspectives on Same-Sex Relationships, 7 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 245, 329-36 (1998) (comments by William N. Eskridge,
Jr. and Sheila Rose Foster); Marcosson, supra note 272.  In Foster’s words: “The
good news is that by looking to previous civil rights movements, in particular, the
Civil Rights Movement, and characterizing the issue as one of civil rights, gets the
attention of the public.  Therefore, I think it is a strategic ploy that works.”  Sym-
posium, supra, at 332.  Or in Eskridge’s words: “Certainly, in the Colorado case, as
you know, the race card was played. . . .  It seems to me also that when you make
these sort of analogies, you are trying to destabilize the status quo.”  Id. at 333.
On this strategy, see David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998).
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Surely this is too simple a tale to be telling about the people of
Alaska and the question of marriage.304  Are there not at least two
legitimate points of view on this question?305  Are the people them-
selves not engaged in a quintessentially democratic debate about
how to handle it?306  After all is said and done, the rule of law ap-
304. For  similar attention to the complex reality of events in Colorado, without
a defense of Amendment 2 as such, see Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 167 (1997).
305. Koppelman admits that these are “contestable” judgments, with which
“[r]easonable people may disagree.”  Koppelman, supra note 277, at 136.  He also
grants that the state can legitimately promote morality, see id. at 139 n.239, and
considers his own argument a moral argument about what marriage law should be.
Carlos A. Ball has also argued that “it is impossible to engage in a fruitful discus-
sion of same-sex marriage without engaging the normative questions; it is impos-
sible to grapple with the complexities of the issue by simply asking for equality
and state-neutrality and for protection against discrimination.”  Carlos A. Ball,
Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Po-
litical Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1942 (1997). A similar critique and proposal
has been offered by Chai R. Feldblum in A Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485 (1998).  Robert P. George has
also offered incisive pieces on democratic disagreement about moral questions, in
which he also addresses the issue of same-sex marriage.  See Robert P. George,
Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J.
2475, 2495-2501 (1997); Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, and Moral Dis-
agreement, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1400-05 (1997) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING & POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)).
Having granted that the question of marriage involves normative judgments,
and having granted that these judgments are “contestable,” and presumably hav-
ing granted that law professors, litigators and judges have no special corner on
moral judgment, the question is as follows: Why does Koppelman believe that his
moral argument should be legally privileged over others?  As As Richard John
Neuhaus has observed, “[p]opularly debating the Constitution is a very American
thing to do and should not be left to professional politicians and the elite legal cul-
ture of constitutional scholarship . . . .  Those who cannot democratically persuade
the people to support their policy preferences have a deep stake in the continua-
tion of judicial tyranny.”  RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE END OF DEMOCRACY?
260 (1997).  Koppelman argues that the Court has a duty to decide the issue: “If
the Court is not altogether going to abdicate its Fourteenth Amendment role, then
it has to make its own best judgment.”  Koppelman, supra note 277, at 137.
306. “By seizing the reins of Hawaii’s democratic institutions, laws and policies
can be written for the benefit of the silent local majority.  In the process, non-
locals can integrate rather than dominate.”  Andrew Hiroshi Aoki, American De-
mocracy in Hawaii: Finding a Place for Local Culture, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 605,
638 (1995) (emphasizing citizen participation according to “local” values of “Fam-
ily-centeredness,” “gifting,” “consensus resolution,” and “openness,” while over-
coming tendencies toward conflict avoidance and excessive self-restraint).
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plies to all who live under it, including those who interpret it.307  In
the recent words of Professor Stephen Carter of Yale:
Although judges write as though they are outside the govern-
ment, I have followed the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s
suggestion that courts are no different from any other part of the
sovereign.  Therefore, they share in the responsibility to uphold
the dissenting tradition of the Declaration of Independence, and
thus not to be too ready to rebuff the repeated petitions of angry
citizens.  This implies a judicial duty to give a degree of consid-
eration to the public reception of their work, a perhaps heretical
claim in this era of judicial popularity, but a perfectly sensible
one if one believes that courts, too, govern.308
If it is really true that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the peo-
ple,”309 and that “[a]ll government originates with the people, is
founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of
the people as a whole”310 — including the judiciary itself — then
surely the people must have the last word.  For the people to have
that last word is consistent with the Alaska and United States Con-
stitutions.
V.  CONCLUSION
In this article, we have examined the origins, passage, meaning
and constitutionality of the Alaska Marriage Amendment.  Despite
the overwhelming approval of the Amendment, the plaintiffs in
307. Lutz states:
The Supreme Court may be the conscience of America, but ultimately
whether that conscience is correct or not is up to a majority, using the
political process in the Constitution, to decide . . . .  Let the Court do its
job as well as it can, and let the rest of the citizens do theirs, in part by
using the political system and not leaving it to the Court to complete the
Americans’ founding as a people.
Lutz, supra note 76, at 170.  Maybe then “Americans can speak more clearly to
each other as members of a wildly diverse, liberty-loving, self-defining, self-
governing people.”  Id.
308. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED 142 (1998).
For every time we say . . . that only our own vision of constitutional
meaning has any reality, a reality that must be universal — we are saying,
in effect, that there is wickedness abroad but those of us who are able to
reason and influence the national sovereign do not share in it.  We are
saying that everyone else is the problem but we are the solution.  We are
saying that the millions of Americans who do not trust the national gov-
ernment are right not to trust it; they are right not to trust it because we
are the national government, and we do not trust them.  That is not an at-
tractive vision of democracy.
Id. at 143.
309. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2.  This precedes the provision on civil rights,
which appears in article I, § 3.
310. Id.
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Brause continue their quest to legitimize same-sex marriage
through the courts.  If they cannot obtain marriage, they insist they
still have a constitutional right to every marital benefit.
Will the people’s determination to resolve the controversy
over the definition of marriage be frustrated by years of litigation
attempting to overturn their judgment?  Or will the courts submit
to the vote?  The people of Alaska await the answer to these ques-
tions.  In the meantime, the voters have added this text into their
Constitution:
Marriage.  To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may
exist only between one man and one woman.311
311. S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998), as modified by Pre-
liminary Opinion and Order at 5, Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-8812, S-8821,
aff’d, Bess v. Ulmer, 1999 WL 619092, at *14 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999).
